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Abstract
Shipbuilding, perhaps more than any other industry, has been subject to a major
shift in geographic distribution in recent years. In the post-World War II period, the
British shipbuilders succumbed to the other western European shipbuilders who by
then commanded the most sophisticated technologies. Before long, however, these
western European shipbuilders lost their market share leadership to the Japanese.
Today, a potential challenge to the indomitable Japanese shipbuilders is coming from
South Korea and other NICs.
In shipbuilding industry, a lot of people have predicted that China may well emerge
as the industry leader toward the end of the twentieth century. But no one in west-
ern countries goes to the depth to do some research to analyze where on earth the
comparative advantage exists in China's shipbuilding industry.
In my thesis, I am trying to introduce the China's shipbuilding industry in detail and
use Michael Porter's theory about competitive advantage to analyze where the com-
petitive advantage and disadvantage of China's shipbuilding industry are. Michael
Porter's insight has been to highlight the reasons why certain industries are so strong
in certain countries and vital importance of "clusters" of industry environment. By
analyzing the historical global shifts of shipbuilding industry, we could see the inter-
action among the determinants in the shipbuilding industry and how the effectiveness
of these interactions decides the competitive advantage of nation's shipbuilding indus-
try. The large source of labor and enormous domestic demands of the ships are one
of China's advantage. With the help of license agreements and joint ventures, China
is fagging to establish its reputation in shipbuilding industry in a short time. I will
suggest a cost focus strategy for China's shipbuilding industry at the present time.
When the industry goes into maturity, China could adopt cost leadership strategy to
compete other shipbuilding nations.
Thesis Supervisor: Frankel E.G.
Title: Professor of Ocean Systems and Management
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Global Trends
In the progress from birth to aging, shipbuilding industry experiences different forces
which compel a shift in geographic distribution. At a time when, the world's mer-
chant vessels were still made of wood, the United States was an undisputed leader
in the shipbuilding industry with its abundant supply of cheap timber. With the
advent of the steam-powered steel ship, however, the supremacy of the U.S. ship-
wrights was quickly eroded by the British shipbuilders, who by 1882 captured 80
percent of the world's shipbuilding market. In the post-World War II period, the
British shipbuilders succumbed to the other Western European shipbuilders who by
then commanded the most sophisticated technologies. Before long, these Western
European shipbuilders lost their market share leadership to the Japanese (table 1.1).
After 1965, Japan firmly established its leadship and held on to it with almost 50
percent of the world market.
Ever since the precedent set by Japan, shipbuilding has been perceived as key player
in modernization of society and the furthering of national development which follows
from industrialization. Shipbuilding is an enticing tool of development for three rea-
sons. In the first place, it is a medium-technology industry which appears to conform
to the factor-cost advantages of NICs. Thus, technology does not act as a barrier
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to entry on the one hand, and the labor-intensity of the industry works in favor of
countries with large, cheap labor forces. Mr. Yoshio Miwa, Managing Director of
Hitachi Zosen explained to Marine Engineers Review that more automation was not
the complete answer at the existing level of technology because over 50% of ship con-
struction could not be automated[58]. Secondly, the market is peculiarly open, which
is to say, customers for ships are truly found all over the world. The existence of flags-
covenience fleets adds to the emphasis on price competitiveness in the market and
allows shipowners to circumvent market protection imposed by national governments.
A newly-emergent producer, capitalizing on low factor costs, can offer competitively-
priced ships which rapidly find customers in such an open market. Thirdly, ship-
building has strong linkages with other industries. It should, therefore, serve to foster
other nascent industries in the NICs. For example, shipbuilding acts as a stimulant
to a host of steel-making and machinery sectors: all vital to the industrialization of
the country. Not surprisingly, therefore, shipbuilding has been singled out by a num-
ber of countries in recent years as deserving of special treatment. Today a potential
challenge to the indomitable Japanese shipbuilders is coming from South Korea, the
People's Republic of China and other newly industrialized countries(NIC)(table 1.2).
Surveying the history of shipbuilding one can immediately raise a lot of questions:
What caused the shift of leadship in shipbuilding over time? Why did certain nations
achieve particular success in shipbuilding at a certain time? Who will be the next?
1.2 Classic Competitive Advantage Theory
There is a long history of efforts to explain international success in industries in the
form of international trade. Adam Smith's original statement of the case for trade,
contained in his epic The Wealth of Nations (1776), was couched in terms of absolute
cost differences between the countries. That is, Smith assumed that each country
could produce one or more commodities at a lower real cost than its trading partners.
10
Table 1.1: Merchant ships completed by Japan 1960-1991[49]
Year No 1000 grt/gt grt/gt-% of world
completions
1960 653 1838.7 21.9
1965 699 4885.6 41.5
1970 1037 10100.0 48.1
1975 930 16991.2 49.7
1980 943 6094.1 46.5
1981 839 8399.8 49.6
1982 800 8162.9 48.5
1983 755 6670.3 41.9
1984 902 9711.4 53.0
1985 817 9502.8 52.3
1986 648 8178.0 48.5
1987 616 5707.9 46.6
1988 598 4040.2 37.0
1989 640 5364.6 40.5
1990 633 6824.1 43.0
1991 602 7282.8 45.2
Table 1.2: New Building On Order-Fairplay
Japan South Korea China
Year.month Total dwt dwt-%o Total dwt dwt-%o Total dwt dwt-%
(1000) of world (1000) of world (1000) of world
93.1 24,664 38 13,052 20 4,183 6.5
92.1 28,901 41 15,480 22 2,905 4.1
91.1 29,228 40.5 15,503 21.5 2,218 3
90.1 18,984 33.3 13,079 23 1,439 2.5
89.4 11,652 27.9 10,783 26 1,165 2.8
88.11 8,445 25.3 10,783 32.2 1,404 4.2
87.1 9,533 28.3 8,484 25.2 1,867 5.5
86.1 17,790 41 8,426 19.5 1,888 4.4
85.1 23,433 43 10,785 19.8 1,829 3.4
84.1 28,795 43 11,503 17 1,908 2.8
83.1 19,137 34.4 5,235 9.4 1,468 2.6
82.4 24,054 36.6 6,260 9.5 1,424 2.2
81.2 27,885 40.7 4,914 7.2 848 1.2
80.2 20,277 33.3 4,387 7.2 437 0.7
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It then follows that each country will benefit from specialization in those commodi-
ties in which it has an "absolute advantage" (for example, can produce at lower real
cost than another country). "Real cost", for Smith, meant the amount of labor time
required to produce a commodity.
David Ricardo clearly showed, in his Principles of Political Economy (1817), that
absolute cost advantage are not a necessary condition for two nations to gain from
trade with each other. He recognized that market forces will allocate a nation's re-
sources to those industries where it is relatively most productive. This means that a
nation might still import a good where it could be the low-cost producer if it is even
more productive in producing other goods. In Richardo's theory, trade was based on
labor productivity differences between nations. He attributed these to unexplained
differences in the environment of nations that favored some industries. The domi-
nant version of comparative advantage theory, due initially to Hechscher and Ohlin,
is based on the idea that nations all have equivalent technology by differing in their
endowments of so-called factors of production such as land, labor, natural resources,
and capital. Factors are nothing more than the basic inputs necessary for production.
Nations gain factor-based comparative advantage in industries that make intensive
use of the factors they possess in abundance. Nations with abundant low-cost la-
bor will export labor-intensive goods, while nations with high technology will export
capital-intensive goods. The assumptions underlying factor comparative advantage
were more persuasive in the eighteenth and nineteenth, when many industries were
fragmented, production was more labor- and less skill-intensive, and much trade re-
flected differences in growing conditions, natural resources, and capital.
It has become generally recognized, however, that these theories have grown inad-
equate to explain the current issues. Evidence hard to reconcile with factor compar-
ative advantage is not difficult to find. Korea, having virtually no capital after the
Korean War, was still able eventually to achieve substantial exports in a wide range
of relatively capital-intensive industries such as shipbuilding, steel, and automobiles.
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Most important, however, is that there has been a growing awareness that the as-
sumptions underlying factor comparative advantage theories of trade are unrealistic
in many industries[6]. The standard theory assumes that there are no economies of
scale, that technologies everywhere are identical, that products are undifferentiated,
and that the pool of national factors is fixed. The theory also assumes that capital
does not move among nations. All those assumptions bear little relation, in most
industries, to actual competition. Especially, governments can alter factor advantage
either overall or in specific sectors through various forms of intervention. Govern-
ments have, rightly or wrongly, implemented various policies designed to improve
comparative advantage in factor costs. Examples are reduction of interest rates, ef-
forts to hold down wage costs, devaluation that seeked to affect comparative prices,
subsidies, special depreciation allowances, and export financing addressed at particu-
lar sectors. Each in its own way, and over differing time horizons, these policies aim to
lower the relative costs of a nations' industry compared to those of international rivals.
1.3 New Competitive Advantage Theory
Michael Porter, the American business guru, in his book, The Competitive Advantage
of Nations(1990), analyzed the theoretical framework to explain why certain nations
achieve particular success in certain industries. Fundamental to his study was the
interaction between four main attributes forming the Porter " Diamond "(figure 1-1)
* Factor conditions are the fundamentals of production which enable a country
to compete in certain industries and include raw materials, knowledge resources,
capital resources, skilled labor and national infrastructure.
* Demand conditions are the nature of the domestic market for the industry's
product. For example shipping industry in being very demanding customers
plays an important role in the shipbuilding industry.
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* Related and supporting industries is the presence in the nation of suppliers
and related industries. The degree the depth of the maritime cluster and the
wide range of services that can be supplied by the domestic market could greatly
affect the competitive advantage of the shipbuilding industry.
* Firm strategy, structure and rivalry reflects the depth of competition in
the domestic market. For example, there are seven major shipbuilding concerns
in Japan, which compete together so as to stimulate product innovations and
the improvement of product process.
In addition to the four main attributes, two other factors can play a role; chance and
government. Chance events are occurrences that have little to do with circumstances
in a nation and are often largely outside the power of firms to influence. Acts of
pure invention, discontinuities in input costs such as the oil shocks, significant shifts
in world financial markets or exchange rates, wars etc. are particularly important in
influencing competitive advantage as you can see when I talk about it in the chapter
2. Government policy in Japan and Korea is particularly associated with the success
these nation's shipbuilding have enjoyed.
1.4 Organization of Thesis
During the last 10 years, Michael Porter has carved out a rapidly growing reputa-
tion for his work on competition. His insights have been highlighted the reasons why
certain industries are so strong in some counties and pointed to the vital importance
of clusters of suppliers, customers, rivals in the domestic market. I will use Porter's
theory to analyze the competitive advantage of China's shipbuilding industry and
recommend a strategy appropriate to China. In chapter 2, I will trace the develop-
ment of that industry to test whether Porter's theory is valid for the shipbuilding
industry. The operation and interplay of the determinants through the history of
modern shipbuilding industry allow us to see the process in which the role of individ-
ual determinants shifts and changes in different countries. Nations are most likely to
14
succeed in industries where the national "Diamond" is the most favorable. In chap-
ter 3, the characteristics of the shipbuilding industry will be discussed because every
industry is unique and has its own unique structure (In shipbuilding industry, for
example, the major portion of the total cost is comprised of purchased materials and
salaries of semi-skilled employees, whereas in pharmaceuticals industry, the major
one is R & D). In order to have a clear picture of China's shipbuilding industry, in
chapter 4, the present status of China's shipbuilding industry will be introduced. In
chapter 5, I will analyze the competitive advantage of China's shipbuilding industry
to determine how China can sustain its position as compared with Japan and South
Korea and where any disadvantage exists, and I will suggest how the industry could
overcome it. In chapter 6, I will recommend a global strategy for China's shipbuilding
industry. My recommendations assumes that there are two basic types of competitive
advantage the industry can possess: low cost or differentiation. These two lead to
three generic strategies for achieving above-average performance: cost leadship, dif-
ferentiation, and focus (cost focus and differentiation focus). After we know what the
position of China's shipbuilding is, it will not be difficult to choose a global strategy.
I hope that my thesis will contribute something to my country.
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Figure 1-1: Michael Porter's Diagram
Firm Strategy,
Structure, and
Rivalry
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Chapter 2
Historical Changes In Global
Leadership
Shipbuilding perhaps more than any other industry, is subject to quicker shift in ge-
ographic distribution. Britain and western Europe has increasingly declined relative
to , first, Japan, and now newly-industrializing countries as well. The Japanese, for
their part, are also evincing a degree of unease at the phenomenal rise of South Korea
and other shipbuilding newcomers such as China. According to the Porter's theory,
the interaction of the determinants in the diamond decides competitive advantage
of the industry in a certain country. Gaining advantage requires a new approach to
competing at a different time, whether it is perceiving and then exploiting a factor
advantage, creating a new product features, changing the process by which a product
is made, or changing policy, or facing the change of domestic and international de-
mand. Comparative advantage is always in dynamic status. In order to understand
the dynamic process by which national advantage was gained or lost in shipbuilding
industry, it was necessary to study the industry's history.
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2.1 Britain
2.1.1 Chance
The early nineteenth century saw two technological breakthroughs in the shipbuild-
ing industry: the introduction of the steam engine and the use of iron and steel
as shipbuilding materials. The steam engine, which had been invented by James
Watt and which triggered the Industrial Revolution in England in the late eighteenth
century, became widely used in ships by the 1830s. The British also pioneered in
steel shipbuilding, taking advantage of the new steel-making technology developed
by Bessemer in 1858. The introduction of the iron and steel hull tended to favor
Britain as a shipbuilding center based on Britain's lead in the Industrial Revolution.
2.1.2 Demand and Factor Conditions
The British mercantile marine was the largest, most up to date and efficient of all
the fleets in the world: it accounted for one-third of the world fleet and was almost
four times the size of its nearest rival, Germany. British producers derived from the
greater size of their market, which allowed for greater inter-yard specialization. The
success of the British resulted from their having captured the expanding domestic
market and much of the foreign market. This was a period when competing maritime
nations lacked developed iron, steel, and engineering industries and sufficient skilled
labor to supply shipyards. Having captured these markets, British producers drew a
critical advantage from the greater extent of the market they commanded, resulting
in a greater continuity of demand for different classes of vessels. This allowed British
builders to achieve a degree of specialization that proved impossible in other mar-
itime nations. The value of new merchant vessels accounted for approximately 1.25
percent of Britain's gross domestic product at the turn of the century, and the in-
dustry employed about 2 percent of the industrial labor force which enjoyed the high
productivity(table 2.1). Between 1890 and 1914 the rate of growth of shipbuilding
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Table 2.1: Comparisons of labor productivity in shipbuilding, 1900[43]
Number employed Tons constructed Output per head
(tons)
UK 85,000 1,290,369 15.2
USA 33,340 385,511 11.6
Germany 31,310 198,097 6.3
France 28,650 134,037 4.7
output exceeded that of the economy as a whole. Britain accounted for 60 percent of
world output of ships and controlled some 80 percent of the world export market as
late as 1913.
British yards on average showed a preference for more labor-intensive methods. Maybe
the severity of cyclical fluctuations in shipbuilding output encouraged British pro-
ducers to minimize capital expenditure in order to avoid the potentially crippling
overhead costs that would be incurred during recessionary periods. The fact that
most vessels were expensive custom-made commodities, built with the close consul-
tation of the owner who usually would pay in installments while the vessel was being
constructed, meant that a strategy of speculative construction and stockpiling ship-
yards necessarily faced periodic depressions in demand and output. This encouraged
British builders to preserve labor-intensive methods and to lay off labor during cyclical
downswings. In Germany and America, on the contrary, interest in technical efficiency
rather than cost minimization, and in innovation for innovation's sake, led to capital
investment which in strictly economic terms was unwise. British entrepreneurs in
general at that time adopted the right technology for British conditions taking into
account relative factor costs and factor endowments, and that Britain was therefore
right to continue up to World War I to exploit comparative advantage in shipbuilding.
However, this leadership began to slip in the early twentieth century as the German
and United States shipbuilding industries adopted significant innovations(including
the diesel engine and the all-welded hull), and by the second half of the twentieth
19
century as almost all major innovations in the industry were being adopted first by
producers outside Britain. Despite the fact that the coated welding electrode, which
made possible the general adoption of welded connections in the 1930s, was a British
invention, the British shipbuilding industry was the last to continue to use rivet-
ing for the assembly of ships hull. It is an oft-cited view that pioneers in the field
of technological development suffer a disadvantage relative to newcomers because of
resistance to change, the effect of sunk costs and the inherent difficulty of introduc-
ing new techniques which do not conform to the specifications of existing plant and
equipment. The British shipbuilding paid the penalty for being the pioneer of the
modern shipbuilding industry, clinging more tenaciously than any other industry to
practical experience and tradition. By 1939, many British shipyards were badly out
of date. The equipment installed was inefficient, production methods such as welding
and prefabrication were regarded with great suspicion and skepticism and the qual-
ity of design had fallen behind that elsewhere. The central reason for the decline
of the British shipbuilding industry was the changing pattern of world demand for
shipping[16]. Actually British shipping industry was slower to adopt tankers[23]. The
failure to adjust promptly and suitably to the changing pattern of world demand for
shipping and to the technological changes resulted in the fewer orders and lower pro-
ductivity.
2.1.3 Supporting Industries
There is little doubt that Britain's lead in the process of industrialization would
have ensured the shipbuilding rise of supremacy. British steel industry could provide
cheaper and high-quality steel. However, slowness to change steam to diesel engine,
to some part, results in the decline of British shipbuilding. Although more costly
than steam engines, diesel engines had an efficiency of 35-40 percent rather than the
20-25 percent obtained from the use of steam. On the long-haul Europe-Australia
routes, hypothetical calculations suggest that a motorship would have generated a
net cash flow two-and-a-half to three times larger than either a coal-fired or oil-fired
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steamship[46]. Domestic reluctance to diesel engines made both ships built in Britain
unattractive and marine engineer backward. Dependency on foreign technology in
marine engineering has affected British shipbuilding industry. Loss of technological
independence in marine engineering is symptomatic of a loss of competitiveness in
the whole field of marine industries. It is difficult to assert that the decline in inno-
vativeness in marine engineering is chiefly responsible for the decline in shipbuilding
competitiveness: nevertheless, there is plenty of circumstantial evidence to suggest
that, in the British case at least, the two went hand-in-hand[55].
2.2 World War II to late 1950s: Western Euro-
pean leadership
During the 1950s, the global economy was recovering from the devastation of World
War II. Most Western European countries other than the United Kingdom made a
conscious effort to expand merchant fleets. A survey suggested that steel prices in
Britain in 1953 were 35 percent lower than in Japan[14]. Although wage rates were al-
ready high (20 to 30 percent higher than in Japan), highly advanced ship component
industries, especially in the production of engines and on-deck machinery, enabled
European builders to set the total price of vessels as much as 10 percent lower than
Japanese builders. As a result, Western European builders had low costs together
with excellent product quality, capturing 70 to 80 percent world market share.
The wage level in the United Kingdom was higher than in the rest of Western
Europe, but its substantial scale economies in production, superiority in compo-
nents(especially in electric components), and its credibility established over a long
period of time enabled it to command 41 to 57 percent of the world market in the
late 1940s. English shipbuilders competed with the global differentiation strategy.
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2.3 Japanese leadership
2.3.1 Government Intervention
The Government-sponsored "Programmed Shipbuilding Scheme" which was intro-
duced in 1947 was the most significant action taken by the state to promote the
growth of its shipbuilding industries. It should be appreciated that until the early
1950s the Scheme was virtually the sole supplier of capital to the shipping firms and
without it they would have been unable to have ordered tonnage from the shipbuilding
companies. The basic foundation of the Scheme was that each year the Government
should decide in advance how much and what type of tonnage should be constructed.
This figure was to take account of the needs of the economy and was to be imple-
mented by the provision of a building fund provided form public sources.
2.3.2 Chance Conditions
The Korean War in June 1950 had a rapid impact upon world shipping. As a result
freight rates, which had tended to rise when the war began, received an extra boost
and by the end of 1950 a full-scale boom was in progress. Thus the Freight Index of
the British Chamber of shipping, which had stood at only 71 in May 1950, rose to
115 by the end of the year and to 203 (the highest since the ending of the Second
World War) in May 1951. Japan, like all other nations, gained from the general up-
turn in world trade, and her geographic position close to the battlefield in Korea gave
her economy some additional benefits. The accumulation of the profit at that time
was of great significance in the future expansion of many industries with engineering,
metal, wood and textiles receiving the largest boost. Shipbuilding, especially, had
experienced a momentary prosperity during the Korean War. Their main European
rivals were already fully occupied in meeting the sudden boom, so the way was open
for the Japanese industry to fill the gap between demand and supply.
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The need to increase the size of tankers to offset the rising cost of carrying crude
oil over longer distances from the Persian Gulf to Europe stemmed from the unaccess
to the Suez Canal in June 1956. Once started, the movement toward larger tankers
gained momentum independently from the Canal's situation in order to achieve fur-
ther reductions in transport costs. The closure of the Canal was one important ele-
ment in this, but a number of other factors were also working in the same direction.
One such was that after the Second World War oil refineries had tended to move from
the producing to the consuming areas. At the existing level of technology this meant
that more tonnage was required for a given level of demand, as at that time part of the
crude oil that was transported could not be effectively refined into finished products.
In addition the increased proportion of world oil which originated in the Persian Gulf,
in place of that from America, increased the distance across which much of the crude
had to be carried to the refineries. These factors, combined with a sharply increased
oil consumption, created further demand for the larger, more efficient tankers. The
scence was thus set for the creation of various specialized ships of larger size which
proved to be economical for carrying particular bulky cargoes. This was enabled by
the appearance of big manufacturing firms like steel-makers, each of which created a
large demand for shipping services, for the lifting of their respective materials. The
overall effect of these changing demands on shipping technology was beneficial to
Japanese shipbuilders. This was because the process of nationalization had gone far
enough to give the shipbuilders sufficient economies of scale that could lead the world
in the new technology. The years from the ending of the Korean War in 1953 to the
reopening of the Suez Canal in 1957 were crucial ones for the Japanese shipbuilding
industry. It was during this period that Japan became the world's largest producer
and established herself as an important exporter(table 2.2)
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Table 2.2: Progress of Japanese shipbuilding,
Order received
(g.t.)
310,354
612,952
486,472
412,140
935,370
2,656,432
2,904,311
2,044,861
Percentage occupied
by foreign orders %
16
38
9
40
69
86
64
56
1950-57[14]
Tonnage completed
(g.t.)
368,370
472,490
541,076
664,037
430,392
756,695
1,781,058
2,355,854
2.3.3 Factor and Demand Conditions
Japan was instrumental in developing efficient construction of VLCCs and associated
process innovations affected shipyard layout and management. Furthermore, it per-
fected the idea of the standard prefabricated ship, introduced by the US shipbuilding
industry as the cornerstone of its wartime programme. Flow-line series-production
techniques were initiated in US wartime shipyards. The Japanese benefited from the
presence in their midst of Daniel Ludwig. The VLCC and standard-ship product
innovations constituted the twin pillars upon which Japanese postwar shipbuilding
supremacy was founded. Technological change plus a judicious mix of the other
factors of production served to give the Japanese a definite cost advantage in ship
construction. In the first place, they were able to arrive at an optimum block size
in modular construction which emphasized the efficiencies of mass production. Sec-
ondly, they made use of parallel building methods such that assemblies for several
standard ships could be in process of simultaneous building. In this manner, series-
built ships allowed for bulk economies in materials purchases and minimum delays in
construction time. The last factor, that of shortened delivery times, was furthered by
the wide-scale adoption of pre-outfitting methods.
By the mid 1960s Japanese tanker prices were from 15 to 20 percent lower than UK
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Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
=
prices and less than West German and Swedish prices by about half that amount.
Their price advantage over those nations amounted to between 7.5 and 15 percent
in the case of bulkers, although the Japanese edge in cargo liner prices was scarcely
significant. These price advantages owed very little to labor cost differences. The
average hourly wage rates in 1964 for the leading shipbuilding nations was estimated
to be $3.00 for the USA, $1.69 for Sweden, $1.08 for West Germany, $0.96 for the
UK, and $0.73 for Japan. The advantage afforded to Japan by cheap labor cost was
neutralized by two factors. First of all, labor costs represented only about 20 percent
of total ship production costs in most countries for most types of merchant vessels
and therefore, any savings in labor, it was argued, could have but a marginal effect
on the overall pricing of ships. Secondly, Japanese shipbuilders enjoyed a large price
advantage in tankships; vessels that are less labor-intensive than other types of ship.
If the costs advantage accruing to Japan stemmed from cheap labor, it would logi-
cally have shown itself in the price differences pertaining to cargo liners; a type vessel
expensive in labor input but one, in which, Japan had little competitive edge.
Porter's theory claims that advanced factors are more important than others. Tech-
nology innovation needs a high level of research. Actually, technology innovation
could improve factor and demand conditions such as cost reduction and more de-
mand. The evolution of the economical hull form by IHI, for example, enabled weight
reduction while boosting the ship's carrying capacity. One obvious outcome of the
new hull form was a relative decline in the amount of steel needed for ship construc-
tion. A second outcome was of direct benefit to the shipowner; namely, an increase
in freight-earning capacity per unit weight of the vessel constructed. More benefits
accrued to the shipowner from the costs for the ship operator. The bulbous and cylin-
drical bows were employed by Nippon Kokan (NKK). In that case, energy was saved
a lot. So shipowners will be more willing to buy the ships built by the technology-
oriented shipyards. In production engineering, reductions in the thickness of ship's
plates combined with greater economies in steel usage throughout the shipbuilding
process led to a 36 percent cut in steel input per grt from 1958 to 1964 in large tanker
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construction. As steel costs tend to be the largest individual cost constituent of large
tankers, it is not an accident that Japanese competitiveness in this market was consid-
erably enhanced. Innovations were also implemented in the allied marine engineering
field. The introduction of advanced admission thermal and reheat cycles enabled
IHI to produce the world's most fuel-efficient steam turbine engine in 1966. Marine
diesel technology was not neglected either. Application of turbo-charging techniques
to make use of exhaust gas energy served to augment the output of a given size of
engine by almost 35 percent. The Ministry of Transport (MOT) concluded that, as
a direct result of improvements in shipbuilding techniques, the man-hours required
to produce one gross ton of tanker dipped from 100 in 1958 to 40 in 1964 while,
during the same time horizon, the amount of hull steel required for the identical unit
output plunged from an index value of 100 to 64. The complementary process inno-
vations effected a radical change in shipyard lay-out to accommodate the production
of large standard ships built in prefabricated blocks. As early as 1949-54 the yards
were reporting that the adoption of block building, prefabrication of parts and weld-
ing combined to cut material consumption by 17 percent. After a suitable gestation
period, block fabrication by welding was able to accomplish a 30-40 percent paring
of labor costs and was instrumental in slashing tanker construction times from about
seven months to scarcely four months. These innovations afforded shipbuilders the
opportunity to realize significant economies of scale in the fabrication of large vessels,
especially when those vessels could be built in batches rather than single units. It
was calculated that when the cost of building a 55,000 dwt tanker was accorded an
index value of 100 per ton, the equivalent cost for a vessel of 100,000 dwt reduced to
78, a 150,000 tonnage registered 70, a 200,000 dwt tanker cost 67, but shipbuilders
able to avail themselves of giant docks could produce 300,000 dwt VLCCs for as little
as 45 per ton and 500,000 dwt ULCCs for a paltry 35 per ton. With these structural
assets, Japan had already dominant share of the world tanker market.
The national economic growth resulted in the expansion of shipping, which devel-
oped more demand of ships to shipbuilding industries. The economic growth rate ran
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at well over 10 percent per annum in real terms from 1964 to 1972. Japan's expansion
during this era was totally exported-oriented, so Japan's merchant shipping fleet grew
from 9.1 million g.t. in 1964 to 34.9 million g.t. in 1973, an increase of 383 percent. In
the meantime, shipbuilding industry grew rapidly so that vessels completed increased
form 2.01 million g.t. in 1961 to 14.18 million g.t. in 1973[14].
2.4 South Korea Shipbuilding
2.4.1 Government Intervention
The spectacular growth of South Korea in shipbuilding, from rank 70th in 1975 to
second only to Japan in the 1980s has been attributed to the policies of the Seoul
government of granting subsidies and export credit to infant industries. The Kore-
ans prefer to downplay the importance of government-arguing that apart from an
initial five year tax break they receive on direct subsidies-and claim, instead, that
their phenomenal success in shipbuilding is owned to largely efficient modern plant,
low steel prices, and a cheap, highly-disciplined labor force. Wages, for instance, are
about one third those paid by the Japanese. They have taken advantage, moreover,
of technology transfer arrangements largely from Japan to acquire state-of-art ship
design expertise. In fact, the truth of the matter lies in a combination of far-sighted
government planning and entrepreneurial initiative quick and ready to grasp new op-
portunities in shipbuilding.
Hyundai built the world's largest shipyard at Ulsan. To a great extent, the risks
taken by the Hyundai were guaranteed by the support given by President Park[56].
It was Park, after all, who arranged for the state to establish a shipping line to take
over three VLCCs that Hyundai were building. Cancellation of this contract in 1975
presented Hyundai with the prospect of huge losses if the government had not, op-
portunely, stepped in to take necessity of Korea to carry out the pathbreaking step
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entailed in the establishment of the mammoth greenfield shipyard and he was not
prepared to see Hyundai face bankruptcy. This example of the ultimate guarantee
of government support for the shipyard projects was of immeasurable benefit to the
chaebol, sufficing to make palatable projects which would otherwise have appeared
to bear unjustifiably high risk. The government would brook no opposition to its
vision of shipbuilding as a pillar of national economic development. It applied all its
powers to sustaining the industry. Survival in oil crisis was sought in the dry cargo
and Ro-Ro markets rather than in tankers, and the MCI made available additional
export credits to entice overseas shipowners into ordering in South Korea. Rigidly
enforced protectionism helped conjure up business for the yard. The government in-
sisted, for example, that all domestic ships below 4,000 gt (13,000 gt from 1969) must
be built at home and, in order to encourage orders, went on to offer subsidized loans
to shipowners which bore interest rates of 7.5 percent as opposed to the normal bank
rate of 25 percent.
Policies compatible with shipbuilding expansion were conducted with a vengeance
by the government in the second half of the 1970s. Set on providing a "captive"
market for the builders, Korea Maritime and Ports Administration (KMPA) declared
its intention of ensuring that the country not merely adhered to the UNCTAD liner
code on shipping, but bettered it. The KMPA, unimpressed by the proposed share
for domestic vessels, wanted half of all cargo involved in the liner trades touching the
country to be transported in Korean Ships by 1981. To that end, it disbursed loans
to shipowners, notably to those in sympathy with its aim of subjecting 65 percent
cargo movements to containerization associated with this fleet expansion, valuing in
particular the receipt of orders for relatively sophisticated container ships.
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2.4.2 Supporting Industries
The purpose of the establishing the Pohang integrated steel plant in Korea ensures the
future self-sufficiency of many downstream activities, including shipbuilding. In spite
of its ability to produce steel one-fifth cheaper than imported supplies, the Pohang
steel mill could only provide 70 percent of the builder's needs. Reliance on foreign
producers of expensive special equipment exacerbated the problems of supply[57].
The fifth five-year plan, initiated in 1982, was as attentive to the needs of shipbuild-
ing as had been its illustrious predecessor. Attention was given to ancillary activities
especially those capable of substituting for the engines, navigation equipment and
special steels which had to be imported from Japan and, alarmingly, constituted up
to 60 percent of ship values. To remedy that failing, the government asserted that
local content must be raised to account for 90 percent of ship values by 1987. Ma-
rine diesel engines, in particular, were targeted for domestic production, and the aim
was to eliminate imports altogether once the new plant had been erected. Valiant
efforts were made by Ssangyong Heavy Industries, the part of the Ssangyong chaebol
discharging the group's responsibility for diesel engines, to meet rising demands in
shipbuilding. By December 1988 its cumulative sales of diesels surpassed the million
bhp mark, and the company was confidently casting around for foreign shipyard cus-
tomers for its engines[55]. In Hyundai Engineering & Machinery Corporation, the
impressive facility's output has surged to secure world leadership in low-speed engine
production in 1991. Performance maintained Hyunder's No 1 status in low-speed
engine production, comfortably ahead of Mitsui of Japan which logged 10.7 percent
of world output[34].
2.4.3 Factor Conditions
The days of low overheads and cheap materials for the Korea shipbuilding industry
are at an end and all the yards now face a future with substantially rising costs for
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labor, materials and equipment. Labor costs in the past two years have risen for all
the major yards by some 50 percent while the cost of shipbuilding steel has doubled
between 1986 and 1988. The drive to reduce cost has led to substantial South Korea
investment in research and development, particularly for computed-aided production.
Increases in productivity have already been achieved, although the exact degree de-
pended on the criteria used. At the end of 1990 there were 38800 people employed
in shipbuilding, but by the end of 1991 this had declined to 31000. Despite these
decreases in manpower South Korea Yards increased output. In 1990 they built 3.57
million gt and 4.43 million gt in 1991. The major yards aim to raise productivity by
15-20 percent by 1995 in an attempt to closes a significant gap with the Japanese in-
dustry. A typical Japanese yard will take 400,000 man-hours to build a VLCC whereas
South Korea in 1992 required twice that much. But In 1987, they took 1.6 million
man-hour[60]. Commitments have been made to invest in research and development
at group level and at government centers. The shipbuilders are involved in a national
computer ship design and production project with the Korea Research Institute for
Ship and Ocean Engineering, universities and research institutes. The government-
sponsored project targets the development and introduction of a computer integrated
manufacturing system for the industry and embraces cost estimation, design, engi-
neering, production and management by exploiting new computer technology. The
project is divided into three phases over 14 years.
2.5 The Implementing of Michael Porter's Com-
petitive Advantage Theory
Nations achieve success in international competition in situations where they possess
advantage in the "Diamond". As we learn from studying in the process of historical
leadership changes in the shipbuilding industry, it is hard to know where to begin
to analyse competitive advantage. The interplay of the determinants is so complex
as to obscure cause and effect. The national environment becomes more favorable
over time as the "Diamond" restructures itself. A country's economic system is also
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constantly in motion. A national industry must continually evolve to reflect shifting
circumstances, or will fall into decline.
National competitive advantage in the shipbuilding industry is lost, however, when
conditions in the national "Diamond" no longer support and stimulate investment
and innovation to match the industry's evolving structure. The national industry
may not perceive needed change, may fail to invest aggressively enough to advance,
or may be blocked by having assets and skills that are specialized to outmoded ways
of competing and that make responding to change more profitable to newcomers. It
is an ofted-cited view that pioneers in the field of technological development suffer a
disadvantage relative to newcomers because of resistance to change, the effect of sunk
costs and the inherent difficulty of introducing new techniques which do not conform
to the specifications of existing plant and equipment. This suggests a hypothesis of
"disadvantage of beginning" which implies that the younger the age of capital stock,
the better the prospects for technical progress; conversely, the possibilities of techno-
logical innovation become increasingly limited as the capital stock grows older. As we
saw before, the decline of shipbuilding in Britain proved this. Technological change
is often a trigger for shifts in national competitive advantages and it can nullify old
competitive advantage and create the need for new ones. Japan adopts new technolo-
gies and new production process to nullify the old competitive advantage in terms of
productivity in western countries. The consequence was that the new technology put
all the established European shipyards at a comparative disadvantage: most of them
occupied cramped sites which could not easily be adopted to the radically different
flow and organization of work, and investment new sites was rarely justified in the
light of the European industry's declining market share. However, despite this, some
European shipyards, particularly in Germany and Norway, did adopt similar tech-
niques in response to the competitive threat of the Japanese industry. In fact, these
Western European countries still advance in sophisticated types like cruiseships and
containerships because they realize the necessity of research.
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Rising factor costs are also a common threat to competitive advantage. The rea-
son why South Korea jumps to the second position was its low labor cost at the
beginning. Why Japan still can sustain its first position is that Japan has realized
the importance of increasing the productivity by decreasing the cost of labor through
robotics and introduction of new production processes. The productivity is increas-
ing by an average 5 percentage per year. This improvement tends to be offset by
wages and various yard expenses which have been rising every year. The gap between
technology though is shortening much faster than the difference in wages. Japan's
shipbuilding industry will meet much great challenge from new industrializing coun-
tries. But it is due to the advanced suppliers that makes Japan keep leading almost
30 years until now. Because overall industrial level is difficult for one country to catch
up with in a short time.
As to the domestic rivalry, the nation like Japan which functions as the world lead-
ership does need to compete vigorously at home and pressure each other to improve
and innovate. But as an infant industry like in NICs, if there is a lot of domestic
rivalry to compete each other in price bidding and technology transfer from advanced
shipbuilding nations in the similar time, it would lead to duplication of efforts and
prevent each firm from gaining economics of scale. For example, if South Korea ship-
yards had competed against each other fiercely at the beginning of the development of
shipbuilding industry, it would have been impossible to emerge as today's strength.
The right strategy in one nation in my opinion is that at the starting time, firms
should corporate with each other and gain economics of scale; at the mature stage,
firms should be encouraged to compete to nullify the types of advantage that come
simply from being in the nation, such as low labor cost in the infant period to force
them to seek high-order and ultimately get more sustainable sources of competitive
advantage.
Chance is often involved in helping to accelerate the process by which an industry
upgrades and penetrates international markets. A chance event such as the closure of
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Sulz Canal created a discontinuity that nullified the advantage of traditional leaders
and allowed Japanese shipyards leaped ahead. Government intervention helped Japan
and South Korea develop their industry in the premature period. A principal factor
in Japanese postwar shipbuilding success was the co-ordinating role of the Ministry
of Transport which formulated areas of research, funded research efforts, and pooled
the results of both private and government enquires during the 1960s. And in South
Korea case, the shipbuilding is the result of the state planning.
The strength of the Japanese maritime cluster encompassing shipping, shipbuilding,
equipment supply, research, education and training, financial status is significant.
This is why Japan still keep its first position in shipbuilding industry until now.
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Chapter 3
Characteristic of Present
Shipbuilding Industry
3.1 Shipbuilding Organization
3.1.1 Shipbuilding Enterprise
Shipbuilding enterprises come in two distinct groups: those that engage purely in
shipbuilding (perhaps including some of its ancillary trades such as marine-engine
building) and those that are diversifies enterprises where shipbuilding is only one of
portfolios of interests that may have very little in common. There are strengths and
drawbacks associated with each of those forms of organization: so much so that they
are frequently all found within a national shipbuilding industry.
Shipbuilders belonging to diversified corporations have the advantage of being able to
rely on corporate resources for expansion and sustenance which are independent of the
conditions applying gin the shipbuilding market. Consequently, in periods of shipping
recession, the shipbuilding member of the group can call upon reserves acquired in
other market areas in order to overcome short-term cash-flow difficulties. Moreover,
this shipbuilder may be able to use group resources to modernize its production facili-
ties at a time when independent shipbuilding firms are being obliged to cut back their
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overheads and capacity: hence, the shipbuilding member of the group can boost its
competitive position relative to other shipbuilders. The flexibility inherent in within-
group transfer of resources to the benefit of shipbuilding operations has played no
small part in the success of Japanese and South Korean shipbuilders. In Japan, five
of Japan's six major shipbuilders had connections with larger, diversified enterprises.
The largest, Mitsubishi(MHI), derived only 19 percent of its sales from shipbuild-
ing and steel structures. The bulk of revenues arose out of its operations in engine
building, machinery, industrial plants, and other activities. Shipbuilding currently
accounts for about 60 percent of the Hyundai(the world's largest shipbuilder) group's
total turnover. There are now plans to reduce this to 50 percent[20]. In yet other
respects, group membership can be advantageous. In the first place, the shipbuilding
member can avail itself of Research & Development (R & D) initiatives sponsored by
the group: initiatives that are likely to be on a more lavish scale than the shipbuilder
could support if it was reliant on shipbuilding profits alone. In the second, diversified
companies are, in the main, large enterprises and as such, command respect in indus-
trial, financial and political circles. This respect may be manifested through easier
access to capital markets. Financial institutions are reluctant to loan because of OPA
90. On the other hand, there are drawbacks to group membership notwithstanding
these clear advantages applying to diversified companies. Unfortunately, this kind of
organization can easily lead to inflexible decision-making. Hierarchical channels tend
to stifle free flow of ideas and this may have a crucial bearing on both the generation
of innovations through R & D and their subsequent acceptance as new production
methods or new products.
3.1.2 Shipyard Organization
The shipyard is essentially an assembly plant geared to the assembling of structural
steel units. Yet it has an important subsidiary manufacturing role, cutting, shap-
ing and otherwise fabricating sheet and plant steel and pipe in conformity with the
specifications of ship design. Sophisticated shipyards may also undertake the man-
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ufacture of propulsion machinery, but to all intents and purposes, shipbuilding is
mainly hull-construction with the option of undertaking machinery manufacture and
outfitting as well. At one extreme, some shipyards merely construct hulls, "buying-in"
machinery and other fittings and leaving the installation of such items to specialist
sub-contractors. At the other extreme, some shipyards are virtually self-sufficient
entities providing steel, machinery and furnishings almost entirely from their own
resources. Perhaps the typical shipbuilder is an organization possessing some facility
for ship design, while undertaking the full range of hull construction functions, and
engaging in various aspects of outfitting activity. In addition to the obvious "human
capital" requirements for design staff and managerial personnel, a typical shipyards
has need of a basic inventory of capital plant and equipment.
Hull construction can be conveniently subdivided into three production phases: stock-
yard activity, steel preparation, and steel fabrication. If traditional shipbuilding was
concerned with a series of sequential steps involving fabrication and assemblage of
individual parts in a piece-by-piece manner, then modern shipbuilding is concerned
with fostering batch production of standardized components and mass production.
This switch is undertaken in order to simplify production as much as possible and
therein reduce the amount of expensive skilled labor in the shipyard by replacing
it with automated equipment. Consequently, the shipyard has become less labor-
intensive and less demanding in the skill mix of the workforce remaining within the
more automated shipbuilding process. A natural corollary of the move towards sim-
plification of production and control of wage costs has been the tendency to abandon
the ancillary machinery and outfitting functions to outside sub-contractors, leaving
the shipyard to concentrate on hull construction Shipbuilders in Japan have made
major use of subcontractors in the outfitting trades for outside labor so that they can
avoid severe cut-backs in their own work forces during the recession.
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3.2 Ship Prices and Costs
The success of the individual shipyard in remaining in business rests on its ability
to command favorable factors of production. These embrace labor, capital and tech-
nology which constitute the costs of running the shipyard and thereby, the costs of
building ships. It follows that a cost-effective supply of factors of production is tan-
tamount to the shipyard offering a competitively-priced ship. By 1978, tonnage on
order had dropped to 20 percent of the peak 1974 levels and has remained close to
that ever since. Shipbuilding capacity has not been sufficiently reduced to match the
low demand levels. Increased productivity and excess capacity and competition from
developing countries have kept a downward pressure on prices. Responding to the
protracted slump in tankers since 1973, yard closures and yard restructuring have
occurred and these measures have reduced the capacity and demand imbalance. The
buyers choose shipyards to build most ships except those sophisticated ships(table 3.1)
according to the price mainly because of the low freight rate in shipping market. The
normal linkage of prices to costs became strained as builders had to absorb an in-
creasing proportion of their overhead expense to make prices attractive enough to
win contracts. It does not necessarily follow, however, that ship prices will be faith-
ful representations of ship costs. In a highly competitive market, shipbuilders will
adopt pricing strategies that are deemed capable of drumming up orders even if the
subsequent completion of those orders requires the shipbuilder to absorb losses on
the contracts in question. The shipbuilder might rationalize such behavior on the
premise that any activity is better than none at all in order to utilize as much of
their capacity as possible. Government intervention( I will talk later) has become
commonplace in the form of subsidies tied to restructuring plans that retain workers
for other industries and commit to reducing shipbuilding capacity.
Prices today are frequently referred to as being at or below cost, the principal com-
ponents of cost being the direct material cost and direct labor costs. Direct material
cost is the cost of all shipyard material that goes into the vessel. Direct labor cost
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is the labor associated with the direct material and is a result of wages and labor
productivity. In normal times, overheads and profit would be added to the direct
costs to obtain the price of the vessel. In these depressed times, however, profit and
overhead components are frequently reduced or overlooked in order to arrive at a
competitive figure.
Vessel costs is the cost incurred by the builder to construct the vessel. Vessel price is
the price a builder charges for the vessel. Vessel cost is the principal element but only
one of many considered in arriving at vessel price. Factors influencing vessel cost:
* Material, labor and yard general expense cost (Construction)[30]
1. Production labor hours
2. production labor costs inclusive of shipyard overhead expense
3. Material costs
4. General expense
5. General and administrative expense allocation
* Vessel design
* Time to construct vessel
* Number of identical ships included in an order
* Yards previous experience with owner
* Owner specified classification and regulatory requirements
* Differences between yards
The direct and indirect (overhead) labor expenses combined with material costs and
general expense comprise the shipyard's product cost, which is the shipbuilding fa-
cility's cost to produce a ship. Additional costs allocated to a project, usually as a
percentage of the product cost, include selling expense and general and administra-
tive expenses. These are assigned as a burden for the corporate services provided
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to the operating divisionshipyard). The allocation for corporate overhead is likely to
range between 4 and 6 percent of the product cost and, when added to the production
expenses, represents the shipbuilding corporation's total cost for a project.
Material costs are normally grouped into the categories of steel, main engine, and
other materials and components. In order to make the material cost low, the country
had better have a strong marine engineering industry and steel production to sup-
port the shipbuilding industry. Production labor costs are derived form the analysis
of production labor hours and the composite labor rate. These labor hours are de-
veloped based on the shipyard's workforce, the industrial engineering and production
research measures taken to improve productivity, and the cooperation of employees
in accepting other work assignments. In order to remain competitive, the shipyard
must have a program which strives to continuously improve productivity. Hourly
compensation is defined as all payments made directly to the worker: pay for time
worked, overtime premiums, shift differentials, bonuses and premium pay, pay for
time not worked including vacations, holidays, and other leave, cost of payment in
kind, employer contributions to legally required insurance programs, and contractual
and private benefit plans. Compensation is measured on an hour-worked basis for ev-
ery country. In addition to labor compensation rates and control of overhead charges,
the third and perhaps most significant factor in determining labor cost is productivity.
3.3 Technological Change
Shipbuilding is, for the most of part, a medium-technology industry. In the ship-
building area the transfer of technology is comparatively easy. Until about 1957, in
the so-called period of reconstruction in Japan, virtually all of the new technology
was introduced from the United States, Great Britain and other European countries.
Shortcoming in technology, when recognized by the shipbuilders themselves, can be
remedied through the process of technology transfer. As its name implies, technology
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transfer is simply the transfer of superior technology from a donor firm to a recip-
ient firm. It differs from innovation diffusion in the sense that it is the result of a
conscious bargain struck between two partners in which both see their way clear to
benefit. Innovation diffusion, however, is the adoption of new technology by firms
other than the innovating firm which is just as likely to take place outside of a formal
sharing agreement as within it. Technology transfer could be divided into two parts:
product innovations and process innovation.
The transfer of product innovations between organizations is fairly commonplace
because it does not usually involve the massive commitment of capital outlays which,
in shipbuilding, accompanies the transfer of process innovations. In fact, product
innovations, by and large, reduce to the issue of ship design, and technology trans-
fer, in turn, is the relatively simple procedure of an exchange of know-how between
shipbuilders. Technology transfer of this kind can be broadly divided into two ar-
eas: first, the transfer of design and expertise from a firm resident in a shipbuilding
nation which is relatively advanced in technological usage to a firm that belongs
to a relatively underdeveloped shipbuilding nation, and secondly, transfer of design
and know-how between firms in nations that are fairly evenly matched in terms of
technological capability. The first area refers, in the main, to the transfer of West Eu-
ropean, American and Japanese innovations to NICs. The second area is confined to
the instances of technology transfer between West European, American and Japanese
shipbuilders. A leading beneficiary of the first type of technology transfer is South
Korea. In 1974 Hyundai Heavy Industries was given a license to build 23,000 dwt
Clyde-class general cargo carriers from Govan shipbuilders of the UK[55]. Process
innovations in shipbuilding improve the operational efficiency of shipyards. Conse-
quently, they are not so much concerned with innovations in ship design as they are
with the methods used in ship production. The UK-China agreement on shipbuilding,
struck in 1982, envisages the transfer of a wide range of innovations from Britain to
the People's Republic of China., including those which are basically process innova-
tions. As well as the construction of BS-designed ships in Chinese yards and joint R
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& D, marketing and training, the British will also supply equipment for rebuilding
the Chinese naval fleet[55].
A high level of efficiency in shipbuilding was attained through the use of extremely
sophisticated and extensive systems involving computers and modern production-line
techniques. This efficiency was subsequently reflected in a sharp rise in new invest-
ment in advanced assembly and fabrication methods. Of particular importance was
the further development of flow-line systems which had already been introduced to
increase the efficiency of fabrication and assembly work and which had been formed
on the basis of block construction. Design work was computerized and in order to
make the most effective use of the larger docks the semitandem building system and
other similar methods were widely adopted. Outfitting was improved by the exten-
sive use of advanced pre-planning and pre-fitting, which was made efficiently by zone
outfitting, which enabled the different jobs required on each block to be carried out
simultaneously. In order to make this more effective, fresh types of production control
were introduced and workers were trained to be versatile so that they could under-
take a range of processes instead of specializing. the whole of the production process
was then subjected to a sophisticated control system, a typical example being PERT
which were widely used. By utilizing a combination of these various methods and
techniques it was possible to make meaningful savings in both the man-hour and ma-
terial consumed, and they also helped to ensure quicker delivery and the fulfillment
of promised delivery dates.
All these developments had various side effects. The production of large sections
reduced the time each ship was under construction, so the turnover of each dock was
increased. It was also discovered that some of fitting work could be transferred to
shore workshops, away from the building docks, and this again had the effect of speed-
ing up the entire process. On the other hand the quicker delivery meant that orders
were completed so rapidly that the Japanese industry, which was export-oriented,
became much more vulnerable to fluctuations in world demand. It should be re-
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membered that the technological advances described above were only valuable when
demand was high enough to justify a continuous throughput of new ships. At times
when orders were scarce the expense of the investment proved to be a heavy burden
for the industry to carry.
3.4 Industrial Maturity
Shipbuilding, just like any other industries, is subjected to life cycle. For the duration
of the childhood stage, production plant is scarce and most of the efforts depends on
human capital; that is to say, the skills infused in the kernel of workers. To test
the waters of market reception, it is vital that the enterprise progressing through
childhood be located in a place conducive to good and easy contact relations with
would-be customers. Skilled workers of this sort are likely to be found in large and
diverse labor pools. Fortuitously, then , the twin locational criteria of market ac-
cessibility and ability to tap skilled and resourceful labor coincide to offer a limited
number of choice sites for a precocious enterprise attempting to force the pace in
product development.
In due course, the enterprise gambles on a preferred prototype, converting it into
a marketable item with an extended production run. Quantity production, in turn,
requires a revamping of process technology. Rather than the assemblage of odd, non-
standing jigs and tools prevalent hitherto, the firm can take the plunge, so to speak,
and invest in product-specific machine tools. The implementation of quantity produc-
tion of either a single product or a narrow range of products effects a transformation
of the enterprise, propelling it into the "adolescent" stage. Attention to the demands
of production comes to the fore. It lends itself to the substitution of machinery and
equipment for skilled manpower and, eventually, leads the firm into the mature stage.
Maturity stamps its presence on the firm by enforcing a regime in which both prod-
ucts and processes are practically standardized. So as well as reducing the quality of
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Table 3.1: Merchant ships (grt/gt-% share of total) completed by principal types
1975-1991[49]
Year Oil
Tankers
75 66.4
76 58.7
77 37.1
78 26.6
79 28.9
80 30.1
81 28.1
82 21.1
83 19.6
84 11.5
85 15.1
86 22.4
87 24.9
88 37.9
89 37.9
90 32
91 42.1
Bulk/Oil
Carriers
4.7
3.7
4.9
3.4
2.7
2.4
4.3
4
4.5
0.7
2.4
3.9
4.1
1.9
0.3
3.8
Ore/Bulk
Carriers
13.6
19.6
28
25.1
16.5
20.1
37.5
46
38.4
50.6
47.2
39.7
31.4
19.1
29
34.9
19.2
General
Cargo
8.1
9.8
17.1
24.6
29.5
20.6
12.5
11
14.4
14.9
13.9
9.7
18.1
17.4
8.9
10.1
9.7
Container
Ships
0.7
1.8
3.7
7.2
7.8
10.5
3
4.6
8.3
9.4
8.4
10.7
9.2
13.5
9.4
10.4
11.9
Liquid Gas
Chemical
2.5
2.6
5.3
6.3
7.9
6.6
6.6
5.4
4.9
4.5
3.3
2.6
1.6
1.4
4.9
5
6
labor, standard process technology rejoices in the added property of reducing it quan-
tity, since, by dint of augmented productivity, fewer workers are required to produce
a given level of output. The enterprise can dispense with expensive labor-intensive
methods along with the work-forces required to operate them and, in their place,
can make use of more cost-effective capital-intensive methods such as mechanization
and automation which are adequately served by cheaper, less skilled work-forces. In
a phase of settled product and process technology, market success depends more on
price competitiveness than product superiority and the firm has no option but to
subscribe to cost minimization as its primary objective. In the mature stage, the
industry is largely devoid of product innovation, has by and large fixed on a well-
known body of knowledge concerning production and, in consequence, presents few
barriers to entry. From the table 3.1, we could see low added valued ships completed
in 1991, which are in a phase of settled product and process technology, takes over 70
percent. Although the ratio of high added valued ships tends to increase according
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Others
4
3.7
3.9
6.8
6.8
9.7
8
7.9
9.9
8.5
9.5
10.2
10.7
8.8
9.5
7.7
7.4
-
to the table 3.1, these types of ships are quick to go to maturity phase, as I said
before, because technology transfer in shipbuilding industry is comparatively easy.
For example, the first 125 000 m3 LNG vessel to built in South Korea was launched
at the Ulsan yard of Hyundai Heavy Industries(HHI) in April, 1993. The vessel will
be delivered to Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. in March 1994[33]. This kind of vessel
is regarded as one of the most complicated now.
3.5 Government Intervention
It is not clear exactly why shipbuilding has been given such massive support, by com-
parison with other industries, when in most countries its contribution to GNP and
to industrial employment has never been more than a few percent[29]. It has been
argued that the share of subcontractors is especially high in shipbuilding and that
therefore many more people are involved than those directly employed by the yards.
This seems to make sense. It has also often been argued that shipbuilding owes its
preferential treatment to considerations of national security. However, it may still be
asked why ships should be produced in each individual country when it is considered
quite natural to import other war materials such as aircraft, tanks and guns. The
fragility of the argument is perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that the US in
peace-time has always had a relatively negligible shipbuilding industry. I think there
is more sense in the argument that for developing countries, shipbuilding would at
least be good for earning foreign exchange and stimulating the programme of national
industrialization, and for developed countries, shipbuilding could keep their industry
advanced because shipbuilding is associated with most industries.
During much of the 1980s, traditional shipyards throughout the world suffered from
the worst shipbuilding recession in history, precipitated by the oil crisis of the mid-
1970s and its subsequent detrimental effect on seaborne trade. The severity of the
situation reflected not only the cyclical nature of the shipbuilding business responding
to fluctuations in the shipping market, but also the massive overbuilding of shipbuild-
ing capacity that had been undertaken in Japan and Europe in response to an un-
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precedented, highly speculative demand for new ships-particularly tankers during the
1960s and the early 1970s. During a ten-year period, for example, Europe increased
its shipbuilding capacity by 136 percent and Japan by 650 percent. Exacerbating the
situation was the entry into the marketplace of new, government-supported yards.
The response of most governments of the world in 1980s to this situation was to pro-
vide increased measures of shipbuilding assistance. If the success of these measures
can be defined as keeping merchant shipbuilding capability alive, then these govern-
ments achieved some degree of success. only three governments- USA, Canada and
Sweden responded to the crisis by terminating commercial shipbuilding subsidies. It
is interesting to note that these three countries are also ones to suffer a complete
collapse of commercial shipbuilding markets in the 1980s.
In general, the major types of shipbuilding subsidies that have been and are still
being provided are the following[53]:
* Special financing (credits): This category includes government-subsidies related
to the financing of ship purchases for export or domestic customers and can
include loans from government banks as well as interest subsidies and loan
guarantees from governments.
* Construction subsidy grants: This type of subsidy encompasses direct govern-
ment payments to shipyards of the contract price.
* Shipyard reorganization aid: This category covers a wide range of government
subsidies to help shipyards modernize their facilities or to otherwise adjust to
downsizing, and has included capital infusions, loan subsidies and guarantees,
government buy-ups of redundant or outmoded facilities, and special tax bene-
fits.
* Research and development aid: This type of aid involves government funding
of research and development programs related to ship or ship production tech-
nology.
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* Tax benefits: This category encompasses government tax measures to shipown-
ers or shipbuilders that are not generally available to all other industries within
that country.
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Chapter 4
Competitive Advantage of China's
Shipbuilding Industry
4.1 China's Shipbuilding Industry
After 1949, China's new leadership recognized the need for a strong shipbuilding in-
dustry for both political and economic reasons. However, China at that time lacked
the personnel and equipment necessary for the task and turned to the former So-
viet Union for aid. The Russians donated engineers, shipbuilding equipment and
ship designs and by the mid 1950s, Chinese shipbuilding was functioning, although
on a modest scale and nearly entirely for the Navy. Research and design institutes
for ship construction and marine engineering were established to advance the coun-
try's shipbuilding capabilities. During these years, the merchant and naval vessels
built in China's shipyards were based on foreign design utilizing foreign materials and
equipment. However, with the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, the shipbuilding industry,
like the petroleum industry, was forced to stand up and walk on its own two feet.
China received some technical aid from Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland
but basically from 1960 forward, China's shipbuilding industry developed along its
own lines. By 1960, however, a 13,000-deadweight-ton freighter, DONGFENG, was
under construction in the Jiangnan shipyard, in the Shanghai shipbuilding complex,
utilizing for the first time Chinese designs, materials, and equipment[22].
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But after 1960, the policy was influences by the former Chinese President, Liu Shaoqi,
who advocated a policy of using foreign chartered tonnage and buying second-hand
ships rather than massive building programmes in an effort to avoid making expensive
mistakes that China could not afford. Technically, the shipyards had not advanced
much beyond the point that the Russians left them. Production was still slow and
based on models built in the 1940s and 1950s. The major improvement was that the
yards now had trained work forces and were able to turn out vessel series such as the
'Da Qing' tankers(modeled on a Polish series).
Since 1982, CSSC has substantially improved the technical upgrading of its ship-
yards and manufacturing plants. Many equipment manufacturers have made license
agreements, or co-production agreements with CSSC as well as joint venture service
stations. MAN B&W diesel engines are produced at Hudong Shipyard and Sulzer
diesel engines at Dalian Shipyard and Shanghai Shipyard. Many equipment manu-
facturers support their product sales with regional offices close at hand. For example,
Alfa-Laval, the Swedish supplier of a wide range of marine engine room equipment
has offices in Hong Kong, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Beijing. Many western marine
equipment manufacturers quickly recognized the need to establish service stations
to support local, and foreign owners in the major shipbuilding centers. In 1986
China announced specific investment plans for the renovation and reconstruction of
six shipyards for building ships for export. These are the Dalian Shipyard, Zhonghua
Shipyard, Xingang shipyard, Jiangnan Shipyard, Hudong Shipyard, and Guangzhou
Shipyard. More modern production machinery has been purchased, together with
replacement machinery bought from shipyards in Europe.
The 132 ships completed by CSSC in 1992 totalled 1.117 million dwt, 36.84% above
the target, up 38% over 1991, according to Shi Fengjun, an official of the corporation's
Production and Business Department. In 1991, CSSC completed vessels of 809,000
dwt, which represented an increase of 26.6% over 1990[8]. The corporation exported
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36 vessels aggregating 597,000 dwt in 1992 which was 53% of its total output. New-
building orders received by Chinese shipyards in 1992 amounted to 1.66 million dwt
an all-time high. The corporation's domestic newbuilding contracts of 1.23 million
dwt in 1992. This will keep Chinese major shipyards busy till 1995. With Chinese
efforts, the country's annual shipbuilding capacity will be increased to two million
deadweight tons by 1995. According to Zhang Shou, the president of CSSC, says: "
For increasing vessel output in the near future, we will mainly rely on further im-
provement of work efficiency rather than facility expansion." For instance, he says,
a 70,000 dwt building berth, which now produces two to three vessels a year, is ex-
pected to build four vessels annually in the coming year(table 5.2). In the next three
years, output is expected to grow by 200,000 dwt annually, to reach 1.6 million dwt
by 1995 double that of 1991.
4.2 Industry Structure and Organization
4.2.1 Structure of China's Shipbuilding Industry
Prior to May 1982, China's shipyards, associated institutes, and factories were or-
ganized under the Sixth Ministry of Machine /Building Industry, the Ministry of
Communications, and the State Administration of Aquatic Products. The Ministry
of Defense exercised input in the design and construction of all types of naval vessels.
Provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions also were permitted to operate
shipyards. Their output, however, played only a small part in the nation's total pro-
duction of oceangoing ships of all types.
Construction of larger merchant ships of various types, specialized vessels to serve
the oil industry's exploration and development efforts, and naval vessels were under
the jurisdiction of the Sixth Ministry of Machine Building Industry's China Corpo-
ration of Shipbuilding Industries(CCSI). Some smaller merchant ships, inland water-
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way vessels, and ship repairs for coastal ships were the province of Communications.
Fishing vessels and their repair came under the supervision of the State Adminis-
tration of Aquatic products. Under this system, the shipbuilding program became
subject of bureaucratic self-interest. The lack of unified jurisdiction over China's
shipbuilding made it difficult to carry out an effective national shipbuilding policy.
The shipbuilding situation was that there was a tremendous duplication of facilities
and bureaucratic overlap. Added to the problem of the bureaucratic overlap was
the fact that most of the supporting facilities for the supply of steel, cement, glass
fiber and machinery were under different ministries, making it sometimes easier to
import equipment from abroad rather than buy it from a local factory. Finally, China
had never really exported a ship before and was not sure what foreign shipowners
expected. Although the PRC had exported craft since the early 1960s - 30 hydrofoil
gunboats to Albania - the idea of competing with other builders of merchant ships
was difficult. The Chinese immediately turned to the Japanese for help and they
appointed a representative to help the Chinese with the shipbuilding programme.
In keeping with the reforms instituted by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 to simplify, re-
structure management, and reduce China's bureaucracy, a number of ministries, state
corporations, and commissions were merged or eliminated in the years that followed.
In the overall review of the government's structure, attention was focused on the
splintered organization of the shipbuilding industry. As a result the Fifth National
Congress in May 1982, directed that the Sixth Ministry of Machine Building Industry
be abolished. At the same time, the Ministry's China Corporation of Shipbuilding
Industry was merged with the shipbuilding and ship repair functions of the Ministry
of Communications to form the new, more unified China State Shipbuilding Cor-
poration(CSSC). CSSC as a state corporation has ministry status under the direct
authority of the State Council(figure 4-1). CSSC's mandate is to[41]:
* produce both civilian and military ships; working in cooperation with the Min-
istry of Communications to provide ships repairs for COSCO and the coastal
fleets, and with the Ministry of Defense(Naval Department) to design and build
50
Figure 4-1: China State Shipbuilding Corporation
GSIC--guangzhou Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
WSIC--Wuhan shipbuilding Industry Corporation
COPEC--China Offshore Platform Corporation
CSTCL--China Shipbuilding Trading CO.LTD.
surface vessels and submarines;
* cooperate with trade officials in securing orders for ship exports;
* increase China's ability to become more self-reliant in ship construction by
developing advanced technology and producing materials and equipment of the
highest standards for the shipbuilding industry;
* conclude and sign contracts with civilian and military buyers for ships and ship
repairs, and to honor those contracts in the strictest manner;
* build ships of all types and off-shore rigs, supply ships, and other equipment to
comply with international standards;
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* build ships of the highest quality in materials and workmanship, at the low-
est costs, to enable the shipbuilding industry to compete effectively in world
shipbuilding markets;
* reduce ship delivery time through greater productivity.
CSSC operates 27 shipyards, 56 equipment manufacturing plants,and now has annual
vessel production capacity of 1.5 million dwt[8]. While the Ministry of Communi-
cations retains the right to import ships, virtually all other shipbuilding functions
except certain ship repairing were transferred to CSSC. Although it would appear to
foreigners as a simple alteration, the change has fundamentally altered the aims and
the day to day operations of shipyards. The most obvious change was that it grouped
various shipyards and factories into units such as Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou
(which includes the yards in Guangxi), Wuhan and Dalian. The units were formed
by taking shipyards and factories that had belonged to other ministries, notably the
Ministry of Communications, and placing these in a self-supporting group. CSSC
takes care about the long term development of shipbuilding industry, such as setting
up strategies, building up new facility, introduction of new technology, establishing
subsidiaries abroad and etc. It also meant that the financing was to be raised by
shipyard and group; thus a shipyard or industrial group was responsible for its own
financing. The system of responsibilities in the shipyard has changed with the ad-
vent of CSSC. Previously the profits of the industry were turned over to the State
as a whole against an annual quota. Under the new system, tax is turned over to
the state and the profit is retained by the corporation. The system applies on three
levels: with CSSC as a whole, with the branch or group, and with the individual units.
Shipyard
Table 4.1 shows the facilities of the major shipyards. Dalian Shipyard belongs to
Dalian Shipbuilding Industry Corporation which includes Bohai Shipyard, Dalian
Marine Diesel Engine Works, Liao-Hai Machinery Factory and the Dalian Marine
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Table 4.1: Building Docks In
Building Docks (m)Shipyard
China[3]
No. of employees
(engineers)
Dalian 350 X 90 X 1 16400
308 X 50 X 1 (3000)
255 X 27 X 2
Hudong 200 X 28.4 X 2 11400
105 X 15 X 8 (1000)
Jiangnan 235 X 40 X 1 13000
210 X 27 X 2 (1300)
Shanghai 228 X 27 X 1 10000
212 X 22 X 1 (1000)
Zhonghua 145 X 21 X 1 6000
145 X 17 X 1 (500)
80 X 15 X 1
Guangzhou 170 X 27 X 1 8000
166 X 22 X 1
70 X 9.2 X 1
Xingang 186 X 28 X 1 6500
128 X 21 X 1
Valve Plant. The industry corporation also engages in land machinery production as
a foil to discontinuities in ship production. Among its range of products are rolling
machines, steam turbines, industrial boilers, pressure vessels, die-casting machines,
oil storage cars and metal furniture. Dalian shipyard is the largest in China, noted
for the construction of large tankers. In 1993, it will deliver a 150,000 deadweight ton
tanker. A 200,000 dwt drydock, the largest in China, will be completed in 1994[8]
at Dalian New Shipyard. By then, China will be able to build ultra-large vessels of
200,000 to 300,000 dwt. Dalian also builds for domestic operation and for export var-
ious size bulk carriers, container and roll-on/roll-off ships, and oil rigs and platforms.
Working with the Ministry of Defenses, Dalian helps to design and then builds war-
ships such as the LUDA class destroyer and fast attack craft of various types for the
Chinese navy. The principal items of equipment manufactured by Dalian Shipyard
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are main propulsion units. Prior to 1979 the yard manufactured their own design,
and in that year negotiations to buy licenses with Sulzer and B&W were completed.
At first they bought all the parts from Japanese licensees but have worked their level
of home-made components up to 60%[40]. The Dalian Shipyard also supplies other
shipyards in China with main engines.
The Shanghai Shipyard Complex includes Jiangnan, Hudong, Shanghai, etc. Shang-
hai is the hub of China's shipping and shipbuilding industries. In 1992 the Shanghai
Port, the third largest port in the world, handled 160 million tons of cargo. Her ship-
yards are estimated to account for almost half of China's shipbuilding capacity[39].
Shanghai Shipbuilding Corporation is particularly interested in obtaining export or-
ders - not only for the hard currencies they bring in, but to increase the development
of its overseas market share. Jiangnan Shipyard whose origin goes back to 1865, is
Shanghai's oldest shipyard. Japanese shipyard design and shipbuilding exports, un-
der contract, have redesigned the shipyard, upgraded training of management and
professional personnel, and introduced the latest technological equipment. Some ex-
isting facilities will be enlarged. After transformation, a 20,000 dwt capacity slipway
in Shanghai's Jiangnan Shipyard will be able to build vessels of up to 70,000 dwt.
It builds oil rigs, platforms and service vessels and contributes to China's defense by
building the ROMEO class submarine and JIANGNAN class frigate combatant ship
for the navy. Jiangnan also built space-event ships for the Ministry of Defense. It is
one of the highest technology shipyards in China and participated in the building of
the ships to test launch Chinese carrier rockets. Shanghai Shipyard was redesigned,
restructured, and modernized in 1979. 20,000 dwt slipway in Shanghai Shipyard will
be able to accommodate 35,000 dwt vessels. It builds and repairs ships, produces cast-
ings and forgings, and builds diesel engines and containers. Ship types constructed by
Shanghai Shipyard include multi-purpose cargo ships, passenger ships for operation
on the Yangtze River, and built carriers of 20,000 to 30,000 deadweight tons. it also
constructs oil rigs and other equipment for the Ministry of Energy Resources and
foreign oil companies, as well as small tugboats for export. Hudong Shipyard is a
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modern, complete shipbuilding complex. Its small and large building ways produce
freighters of up to 10,000dwt and bulk carriers as large as 40,000 tons for domestic and
foreign buyers. Research and computer institutes give backup for the development of
more efficient and productive ship types. The Ministry of Defense looks to Hudong
for the JIANGDONG class and JAINGHU class frigates and small naval craft such
as auxiliary ocean tugs.
Three of South China's principal shipyards, Guangzhou, Huangpu, and Wenchong, are
under the direction of Guangzhou Shipbuilding Corporation. They build freighters,
bulk carriers, multipurpose cargo ships, container ships, crude oil and special prod-
ucts tankers, passenger-cargo combination ships, as well as special-purpose vessels
and structures for China's oil industry and for export. They also build LUDA class
destroyer. Among the other naval vessels ordered by the Ministry of Defense are
JIANGNAN class frigate and small, high-speed patrol craft.
4.2.2 Structure of Shipyard
Structure of Shipyard
Organization for the entire shipyard is shown in Figure 4-2. Besides the Shipbuilding
Division, other line units are: the Engine Division, the Material Supply Department,
Civil Engineering Department, and the Chief Engineer's Office. Administrative and
staff groups include the Chief Economist, Accounting Department, and the Personnel
Department. On the production and production support side:
* The Engine Division designs, fabricates, and markets the low- and medium-
speed engines, and associated auxiliaries. The unit also has large forging, fast-
ing, and heat treating shops.
* The Material Supply Department is responsible for acquisition and transporta-
tion of all materials for the yard.
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Figure 4-2: Shipyard Organization
* The Civil Engineering Department does all of the civil engineering projects for
the yard, including employee housing. The group maintains all of the yard's
facilities and all stationary equipment and tools. In addition, the department
is responsible for the construction of all industrial projects that are fabricated
and assembled at the yard.
* The Chief Engineer is responsible for quality control, metrology, and for all
other technology management within the yard, including physical and chemi-
cal analyses. The unit directs the CAD/CAM developments and application
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program.
On the staff side, the Economics Officer is responsible for long term planning, labor
balance coordination, and contract administration. The Chief Accountant deals with
all financial matters. The personnel Division is responsible for training, education,
personnel administration, and operation of the numerous support groups(like the
hospital, visitor hostel, and children's nurseries). The Shipbuilding Division is the
principal division in the yard. This division has approximately one-half of the yard's
total workforce in its organization. There are four departments and six production
shops/factories in the division:
* The shipbuilding Design Department designs the ships, including advanced con-
cepts. It prepares production working documents, as well as material for regu-
latory approval.
* The Production Management Department handles the production management
for the entire yard; it has responsibility for preparing production plans and
coordinating of the shop production.
* The Shipbuilding Planning Department performs the work load balancing; it
prepares the production instructions, and coordinates the milestone schedules.
* The Safety Department is responsible for safety in the entire shipyard.
* The Hull Construction Shop is one of the main shops for the division. It is
responsible for all of the steel production for both ship and industrial product,
and associated lofting.
* The Machinery and Electrical Workshop is responsible for installation of the
main engines, the navigational equipment, the electrical equipment, and sea
trials. This shop is also responsible for processing of pipe, and its installation
aboard the ship.
* The Painting and Woodwork Fabrication Shop is responsible for all painting
and coating operations and all woodworking jobs, including the manufacturing
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and installation of any wooden furniture.
* The Outfitting Material Fabrication Shop makes foundations, doors, boilers,
small hatch covers, and aluminum doors/windows, and runs the galvanizing and
oxide finishing operations. The shop does not perform any of the installation
activities.
* The Electrical Products Factory fabricates switchboards, cabinets, steel furni-
ture and ship models. Its products are also sold outside the shipyard.
* The Valve Factory manufactures all valves used on the ship. The casing are
manufactured by the Casing Shop - a unit in the yard's Engine Division.
There is a labor union organization; however, it is structured differently than in
Japanese yard. There is no focus on craft orientation by the union, and there are
no work rules requiring that work be performed only by people with a recognized
journeyman skill. As a result, workers can be cross-crafted in their assignments.
4.2.3 Management
Marketing
1. Domestic Sales
The China Ocean Shipping Company(COSCO) under the Ministry of Communica-
tions is the Chinese national merchant ship operator. This firm and its subsidiaries
negotiate the purchase and construction of the majority of Chinese operated merchant
tonnage. The largest Chinese shipyards, as I mentioned before, also build military
vessels for the People's Republic of China navy as well as for export. Commercial
sales to the COSCO are negotiated, primarily, between COSCO and CSSC at the
headquarters level in Beijing. Once a purchase is agreed on. CSSC headquarters allo-
cated that job to a yard with sufficient capacity and the technical know-how to do the
job. After the contract has been assigned, the shipyard may at times negotiate fur-
ther with the COSCO subsidiary accepting delivery. The additional negotiation may
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involve a number of issues including price, delivery date, or shipboard equipment[32].
2. Foreign Sales
Chinese shipbuilders had not much experience of selling ships to foreign customers,
because it was only in 1977 that China exported its first vessel, a 37,000 dwt freighter
to Malaysia though the shipbuilding industry has the experience of building ships for
almost 40 years. In order to make up for this lack of knowledge, in 1982, the China
Shipbuilding Trading Corporation, a subsidiary organization, was formed to adminis-
ter all trading operations of CSSC such as export ships sales, equipment import and
purchase, and now has its own agency offices around the world. In Hong Kong, China
United Shipbuilding Co. Ltd (CUSBC) represents CSTC and handles a substantial
volume of export and import trade. CSTC evolved into large organization which ac-
cumulated considerable knowledge of external markets and established a worldwide
commercial intelligence-gathering network. Even so China can not compete with
Japan in this respect. As we know in chapter 3, Japanese yards belong to zaibatsu
in world Fortune-500 which are more prestigious in the world. A long history results
in more complex network in the world and more market-sensitiveness. Furthermore,
Cultural traditions in Japan emphasize close cooperation not only among units of
large industrial companies, but also among industrial units of different companies in
the same field. As a result, shipbuilding subsidiaries of Japanese governments usually
share information.
Management Training
China's business school used to train accountants and bank clerks. It is only recently
that they have adopted a curriculum similar to western business schools. The pro-
fessors, who used to teach in economics department, do not have adequate training
or any actual experience in business. Marketing courses are yet to be developed. To
the average Chinese, "business" or "trading" has the implication of "dishonesty" and
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"cheating". People with a reasonably good education do not like the idea of "selling"
things. Good sales people and sales managers are the hardest to find.
However, with the economic development, things has been changed a little bit. Tal-
ented people tend to join in the management position. Furthermore, the Chinese focus
a great deal of their management training around western management training at
every opportunity. The Chinese have established formal joint educational programs
with several western universities, including the University of California at Berkeley,
Stanford, the University of Houston, and others. In these joint programs China pro-
vides the students and the western university provides the professors.
The Chinese also encourage experienced western executives to share their knowledge.
In 1983 Mr. Phillip Smith, the retired chief executive officer of Smith, Yuill, and
Company (a U.S. steel manufacturer) went to China to give a series of strategic plan-
ning lectures to Chinese steel executives. In 1985 and 1986 he also served as Dean of
the Senior Executive Program at the Dalian Institute of Technology(the national cen-
ter for industrial, scientific, and technology management development). Mr. Smith's
experience is not unique. The Chinese actively seek out these western experts to gar-
ner their knowledge. This search for knowledge by the Chinese is important because
it provides a base of capable management to continue to develop Chinese shipyards
and other industries, a pool that can then pass its knowledge to other Chinese. The
western emphasis helps elevate Chinese shipbuilding to the advanced levels found in
the west and to accomplish this more quickly than by working alone. And lastly, by
training managers the organization creates the ability to direct the organization to
more favorable environments and to managing and establish negotiated environments
favorable to the organization.
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Decision-Making
Before the reform, Chinese economic is controlled by the planning approach which
is mostly about the use of the planning mechanism to replace market forces in the
production of goods and services, and their distribution and exchange. After 1978,
things changed a lot, but still unsatisfactorily. Business China points out that overall
management of shipbuilding in China is centered at CSSC corporate headquarters[ll].
The CSSC is a national corporation directly under the State Council,
which places it on a level with the other Chinese state ministries(like Ma-
chine Building, Communication, and Finance). The CSSC is responsible
for planning and supervision of the shipbuilding industry. It deals directly
domestic and foreign companies, enterprises, and institutions.
The CSSC central offices in Beijing are where all major corporate decisions are made.
There the bulk of marketing, sales(both foreign and domestic), contracting, finance,
the hiring of all major shipyard management, and production decision activity takes
place. The local shipyard takes the input supplied by Beijing and attempts to meet
the production goals that were set. Local shipyard management and management of
support organizations like research and design units and institutes of higher education
are also under the Beijing bureaucracy. All coordination between units is handled
by the central bureaus of the CSSC. Only after 1987, the decentralization allows the
enterprises more room for independent action; under the unifies state plan, planned
economy is integrated with market conditions. Shipbuilding industry is no exception.
A regional corporation as an economic entity could negotiate directly with potential
customers and takes care of the coordination among the factories. Decisions are made
more effectively, since its headquarters is located at the region and there are represen-
tatives for each shipyard there. The top managers of regional corporation have their
positions at the headquarters of CSSC, which makes the connection between CSSC
and its subordinate closer. Shipyards now have the power not only in production
organizing, but also in marketing and human resource management. Most of the top
managers of different level in CSSC were expertises. In January 1987, the Chinese
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Government announces new rules to " ... promote the system of factory directors as-
suming full responsibility for production and management of the enterprise...". From
macro-management point of view, more decision-making power has been delegated
to the enterprises, although in a limited way compared with Japanese enterprises.
The top-down management often cause late timing of decision which is not prop-
erly coordinated with real need. The extent the enterprise responds to bureaucratic
directives, rather than market signals would influence the efficiency of the enterprises.
From micro-management point of view, we could divide interest group into work-
ers, foreman, middle management, top management. Let us study the influence of
all the interest groups in decision-making[28]. Oiva Laaksonen gathered the data
through interviews in different industries in China and in Japan. We could see from
figure 4-3 that top management in China seems to keep nearly all the decision-making
strings in its hands. The generally smaller influence of Chinese personnel groups can
be a sign of traditional authoritarian and patriarchal Chinese culture. It can also
reflect the whole structure of Chinese socialist society, where the most important
plans and decisions are made centrally by "higher authorities". The influence of Chi-
nese middle managers like "workshop leaders" in decision-making seems to be clearly
smaller in different decision types compared to their Japanese counterparts. Chinese
top management will decide matters which typically should belong to the responsi-
bility area of foreman. In contrast, each level of the organization of the shipyard
in Japan has well-defined decision-making powers and delegation of responsibilities.
Profit sharing incentives usually assure not only peer participation and input into
the decision-making process, but also full cooperation in the implementation of each
decision. The only individual decisions where the Chinese foreman, or work group
leaders, have more than "moderate influence" are replacement of personal equipment
of workers and assignment of tasks to workers. The influence of workers in decision-
making seems to be markedly slight in China compared with Japan. As the industry
has become complex, this influence structure complicates its effect. Without any
influence, workers have almost no motivation. In fact, motivating workers are one
62
Figure 4-3: The influence structure and power distance between different personnels
groups in Chinese and Japanese Enterprises
JapanChina
Middle
Management
Foreman
Workers
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of the important elements for improving productivity in shipyards. Usually in pro-
duction sites, a situation interfering with smooth production occurs almost everyday.
For example, equipment failure, material shortage, absence of workers, and product
defects can occur anytime. The workers find those problems first. Unless they take
necessary action with a positive attitude or report to their supervisors for solving
the problems, the impact on production can not be minimized. It is important to
continue motivating workers so that their positive attitude becomes a customs. It is
obvious that if workers almost can not be in the circle of decistion-making, workers
will get to feel that what happens in factory has nothing to do with them and their
duty is only to work within the required hours.
In Japanese shipyards, there exists the suggestion system which provides opportu-
nities to realize their ideas and makes themselves interactive. Suggestions from below
are quite paid attention to. In terms of total management quality, this can expect a
raise in workers' morale and increase quality and productivity. In contrast to China,
normally, most of the decision plans are first provided by ordinary workers and fore-
men. They have several formal and informal discussions with other employees at
the same level whose sectional interest may be related to this decision, and consensus
among them is sought. A significant feature was workers shifting from a passive mode,
merely waiting for suggestions, to an active programme for educating personnel con-
cerning all aspects. This shift fits comfortably the typical commitment of Japanese
management to developing the skills of all employees fully, and to recognizing that
employees can make a real contribution to organizational effectiveness. Once they
reach consensus, the decision plan is raised to the middle management. They repeat
almost the same process and accumulate their ideas and consensus to the plan. In
this way, the decision plan goes through a hierarchy of the shipyard up to top man-
agement. Although the final decision is taken by the top management, it is the result
of many workers's consensus. Especially for lower level workers, this system provides
an opportunity to participate in decision-making. Therefore, once a decision has been
adopted, all the workers who are familiar with the decision cooperate and the objec-
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tive can be achieved smoothly. Furthermore, the fact is that studies continue to tell
us that employees worldwide want their views to be heard.
One of the main differences in management between Japan and China; the latter
the labor union system does not function, as least openly, as a counter-power to en-
terprise management. There is only one labor union in Chinese shipyard, and 90
percent of the workers participate. Some of the workers are selected to represent
all of the worker; they are called "Workers' Representatives." The union is under
the leadship of the Communist Party. Although about twice each year the shipyard
director is obliged to make a formal report to the Workers' Representatives, this is
only window dressing. After this meeting the representatives will caucus in a series of
small, special focus sessions to develop comments on the director's report, but there is
no absolute requirement that management follow the suggestions/recommendations
on any topic. In the positive respect, Chinese labor unions are the passive supporters
of management. It could not result in the problem like in South Korea that the strike
made the shipbuilding yard a mess to prevent the owners from making contracts in
1989.
Quality Control
Quality control in China is an issue much talked about, but its progress has been
incredibly slow. The past few years China has been placing an increased emphasis
on improving the quality of her manufactured products. Quality control leadership
has come from the highest levels of the Chinese government. The head of China's
government, Deng Xiaoping said, "we cannot only stress production quantity. We
must also pay attention to production quality. In order to open our export market,
the key issue is quality. When production quality is low, the products still become
less competitive. In the past, we only stressed output value and quantity instead of
quality. Actually, the most important issue is production quality". In support of this
speech the State Economic Commission called on various districts and departments
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to earnestly study comrade Deng Xiaoping's view, truly adhere to the principle of
quality first, quicken their pace in meeting international standards, and strengthen
quality control in an overall manner. This concern for quality highlights the shift
that Chinese industry, including shipbuilding, has recently made. Quality now has
real meaning. While few real changes in the quality control program have occurred
yet, the most important change is evidenced.
Chinese shipyards do have a quality control structure in place, even if it is not ef-
fective. Part of the shipyard administration includes a quality control department.
This department is unique in that while under the shipyard's administrative organi-
zation, the department reports directly to the shipyard's chief engineer. The quality
control department or section consists of a measuring division, a quality inspection
division, and a quality control office. The department is responsible for developing
quality control procedures, and maintaining an inspection program to confirm that
the worker is building products to the assigned quality standards. The department
is also the official liaison with the owner's representative and the various regulatory
agencies who regularly inspect the ship during its construction.
In fact, quality control should involve every worker like in Japanese Shipyards. In
Japan, workers themselves form groups to solve problems. The QC circle is defined as
a small group which voluntarily performs quality control activities within the work-
shop to which it belongs, and the small group carries on continuously, as a part of
company-wide quality control activities, self-development and mutual development,
control and improvement with the workshop, utilizing quality control techniques. The
concept of QC circles is well imbedded in the Japanese tradition, by which employees
feel that they share a common destiny with the company. High-quality production
systems and facilities can not guarantee a good production pace without workers'
cooperation. But in China, the employees have no such strong feeling as the ones in
Japan. The workers in Chinese shipyards try their best to pass through the check of
the QC department in one way or another. In fact, they think that the quality of
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products has nothing to do with themselves. In my opinion, Chinese shipyard should
educate the workers to increase the workers' awareness of the importance of the qual-
ity of their products to let them know that the quality decides the shipyard's success
or failure which decide their benefits. If China is to be consistent in this area, we
should expect to see more and more quality control emphasis in Chinese shipyards.
Efficiency and profit maximization is the direction in which industrial management
is now focusing, and quality control is now an important part.
Planning and Coordination
Comprehensive goals are formulated at central CSSC headquarters in Beijing. The
regional corporation is responsible for formulating plans for each shipyard and local
organization under its control as well as keeping CSSC headquarters informed as to
the progress in carrying out the plans. On the local shipyard level, production plan-
ning is the principal planning done. This involves work load, production field, and
manpower balancing. Shipyard planning is accomplished by establishing milestones
for each individual job. Key milestones might include obtaining raw materials, laying
the keel, launch, and delivery. Initial planning takes about one month and in done
by production management. Each job is then coordinated in with the yard's overall
plan developed by the shipyard planning section. At least monthly a shipyard-wide
planning meeting is held. This meeting is attended by the planning representative
from each shop and the shop heads, and is chaired by the shipyard's vice director.
The meeting is used to resolve any planning conflicts and to try to improve yard
efficiency. The local shipyard is responsible for keeping the regional shipbuilding cor-
poration informed on its progress in carrying out all plans.
CSSC has a policy that Shipyards fabricate internally as much of the equipment
as possible. As a result, a greater portion of their requisitions will be for "raw mate-
rial". The remaining materials will be divided into two categories: (1) those materials
(or equipment) that can be purchased form domestic sources within China, and (2)
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those materials that must be purchased abroad.
Materials acquired within the Chinese domestic system, either raw materials or fin-
ished goods, are ordered at specified time each year. The typical order months for
shipyards are February and August; at those times the purchasing agents indicated
to the central organization their material needs 6-12 months into the future. These
requests are then forwarded to the specified supplier, or to a supplier of the central
organization's choice if it is deemed necessary to make the supplier change. If for
some reason it is necessary to acquire the material from abroad, the shipyard must
first secure approval form the central organization. This process takes approximately
three months; only after the approval is given will the purchasing agent be in a posi-
tion to place the purchase order with the overseas suppliers. Approval of the central
organization is only given if one of the following conditions exist[10]:
* The equipment is specifically requested by the owner.
* The material of acceptable quality is not available from a Chinese source.
* The material is not available from a Chinese source within the time period
required.
This structure costs China's shipbuilding a lot. According to Fairplay[31], the 2716
ton Berlin Express is due to be handed over to her owner, Hapag-Lloyd during the
second quarter of 1990. When this ship is finally delivered, she will be more than one
year late on the initial delivery date. In this case, when the order for the vessel was
first placed, in 1987, Hudong looked to Japan for the vessel's 15,000 tonnes of steel.
The order then had to receive ministerial approval in China as I said before. By the
time the contract for the steel was signed, three months had passed. By the time a
ship was in Japan on charter to carry the cargo, several more months had passed.
And by the time that ship was finally discharged at Hudong, it was six months after
the order for the new ship was placed.
Let's compare the time which the procurement of major equipment and material
needed(see 4.4.4 on page(85)) between Chinese Hudong(HSY) and Japanese Kobe
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Table 4.2: Lead time requirements(months)for selected
[9]
Hudong
material for the PD214 [10]
Kobe
Steel Plates 6 2
Auxiliary Machinery 12 9
Main Boiler 14 8
Bridge Console 10 8
Electric Generator 10 8
Main Turbine 14 10
Propeller 6 5
Propeller shaft 6 5
Steering Gear 12 10
yard belonging to Kawasaki Heavy Industries(KHI). Hudong requires much greater
time than does Kawasaki to procure major material and equipment. This means HSY
has longer lag between contract signing and the start of construction. The long lag
delays the delivery of ship. The major milestone of laying keel depends largely on the
lead time requirements of key equipment of key equipment. Both yards, HSY and
KHI, based their keel laying date for the PD214 on the procurement of the boiler.
Lead time are determined form the date of issue of purchase order and the time
of delivery of equipment in the yard. In case of HSY, the lead time for the boiler
is 14 months, while in the case of KHI , the lead time for the boiler is only eight
months(4.2). The Hudong time period included an additional three months in each
case to allow for the necessary approvals from the central organization.
4.3 Demand Condition
4.3.1 General Economic Condition
According to Porter's theory, the strength of an industry is decided by the interaction
of four determinants. It is important for us to know the situation of China's economy
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in the world, especially for the shipbuilding industry, the demand of which is derived.
How fast did China's per capita GNP grow in the 1980s? Table 4.3 compares the
growth rates of GNP in 1980-1990 with those of earlier periods. There can be no
doubt that the growth rate in the 1980s was substantially higher than in the pre-1980
period. Indeed, except for the early 1950s and the three years 1962-65, when the
economy was recovering from war or economic disaster, at no time in the history of
the PRC has the economy grown as fast as in the 1980s.
Today's China is very similar Japan in the 1950s and 1960s. During that period,
Japan's home market demand was growing rapidly in industries in which other na-
tions' markets had begun to level off. This produced some significant advantage. This
demand gave the industries the conviction to invest aggressively in large, efficient fa-
cilities with the latest technology at a time when the industries in other countries
were incrementally adding to existing, less efficient older plants. Now in China, the
problems are the too hot economic development but not the recession like in the other
countries.
As economic growth has accelerated, major changes in the economic structure have
occurred, as shown in Table 4.4. Output and employment structure have shifted in
favor of industry and services, suggesting a continuation of the industrialization pro-
cess. During the 1980s the investment rate and the export-GNP ratio rose sharply.
The rate of increase was much higher in the 1980s than in the 1970s. All in all,
economic achievements in the last decade were quite impressive.
4.3.2 Shipping Industry
The government's stated shipping policy is to carry all of its domestic waterborne
trade and as much of its foreign trade as possible in Chinese flag ships. It is not sur-
prising , therefore, that Chinese-flag ships are carrying over 40 percent of all cargoes
transported in China's total seaborne foreign trade, one of the highest percentage
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Table 4.3: Average Annual Growth Rates
GNP
9.2
2.1
15.1
6.9
5.7
6.5
10.1
7.8
6.2
8.9
6.0
1952-90(%)[61][5]
GNP per capita
6.8
1.3
12.6
4.2
3.5
5.2
8.7
6.2
4.3
7.4
4.7
for any of the world's national-flag merchant fleets. foreign trade is a major fac-
tor in the development of a nation's merchant marine. With regard to international
trade, its volume grew dramatically between 1980 and 1992, from $38.14 billion to
$165.6(table 4.5) for an average rate of growth of over 12 percent. By comparison the
rate of growth of world trade between 1980 and 1991 was 5.5 percent per annum[17].
Thus China's share of world trade, though small, expanded rapidly. According to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in the period 1979-89 China's ranking
as a trading country increased more than any other country in the world1. Its share
of international trade rose from 0.97% to 1.7% during the same period. In 1978,
China was the world's thirty-second ranked exporting country. By 1992, China is
already the world's eleventh largest trading nation with a volume of US$ 165.6 bil-
lion, placing herself ahead of Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea but behind Hong
Kong[54](table 4.5). Such growth, however, poses a problem for China's ocean ship-
ping sector.
China's merchant marine grew steadily larger from 1960 on. In 1991, China's mer-
1GATT, International Trade 1989-90, Vol. I pp.28-30
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Period
1952-57
1951-62
1962-65
1965-70
1970-75
1975-80
1980-85
1985-90
1952-80
1980-90
1980-2000
(planned)
-
Table 4.4: Selected Economic Indicators 1970,1980 and 1990(%)[59]
1970 1980 1990
Share in GDP
Agriculture 47.4 30.4 23.3
Industry 36.0 49.0 52.7
Services 16.6 20.6 24.1
Share in employment
Agriculture 80.8 68.9 60.0
Industry 10.2 18.5 21.4
Services 9.0 12.6 18.6
Rate of investment 26.3 31.8 37.1
Ration of exports to GNP 8.2 10.8 15.2
chant fleet consisted of 2382 ships, and totaled 14.3 million, 3.3 percent of world
fleet[49](table 4.6). China's average annual growth rate of above 3 percent in ship
gross register tonnage was one of the largest for any of the world 's merchant fleets.
China's merchant marine is state owned and controlled. Authority flows from the
National People's Congress through the State Council to the Ministry of Communi-
cations, which directs the nation's domestic and foreign shipping activities. Forced
to look overseas to expand her foreign trade and to reduce her reliance on foreign
ship charters, the government determined to develop China's own nation-flag fleet of
merchant ships. With the approval of the State Council, the Ministry of Commu-
nications, in April 1961, established the China Ocean Shipping Company(COSCO)
as a commercial enterprise. Now it has the world's largest single fleet. Large num-
bers of bulk-cargo, freighter and container ships have been coming into the fleet from
China's own shipyards. By the end of 1986, 18 percent of all the ships in the Chinese
merchant marine were built in the nation's shipyards2 .
2 Source: U.S. Maritime Administration. Special computer printout based on Lloyd's Register of
Shipping computer tapes. October 13, 1987.
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Table 4.5: China's Foreign Trade, 1980-1991(US$billions)[7]
Year Total Imports exports
1980 38.1 20.1 18.1
1981 44.0 22.0 22.0
1982 41.6 19.3 22.3
1983 43.6 21.4 22.2
1984 53.6 27.4 26.1
1985 69.6 42.3 27.4
1986 73.9 42.9 30.9
1987 82.7 43.2 39.4
1988 102.8 55.3 47.5
1989 111.6 52.5 59.1
1990 115.4 53.4 62.1
1991 135.7 63.8 71.9
1992 165.6
COSCO started in 1961 with four vessels totalling less than 30,000 dwt. Today,
it boasts 620 vessels of various types, aggregating 14.54 million dwt. COSCO now
owns and operates 71 full container vessels, seven semi-cellular container vessels, 69
multi-purpose vessels, 16 ro/ro vessels, 14 tankers, 14 timber carriers, two LASH
ships and two passenger ships. "COSCO's fleet expansion aims to serve primarily
China's growing foreign trade," says Chen Zhongbiao, deputy general manager of the
state-owned company[2]. In the last five years the company has purchased 63 vessels
totalling 1.8 million dwt to replace outdated ships. "Our improved service has at-
tracted more customers and made us more competitive on the international shipping
market," says Chen. One of measures that enhance COSCO's competitiveness is re-
flected in a set of service standards for its liner operation described as "pre-selection
of specific ports, determination of fixed shipping routes, creation of fixed schedules,
and assignment of specific vessels." This has made it possible for COSCO's liner
services to maintain a punctuality rate of 100% and guaranteed prompt delivery of
goods, Chen says. The size of its fleet will not see a remarkable increase in the near
future but its structure will be further readjusted according to changing needs, Chen
says. The development of COSCO will first give CSSC a chance to build new ships
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Table 4.6:
Year
1960
1970
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
No.
201
248
955
1051
1108
1179
1262
1408
1562
1773
1841
1907
1948
2382
China-flag Fleet[49]
1000 grt/gt
402
868
6837
7653
8056
8674
9300
10668
11567
12431
12920
13513
13899
14299
% of world fleet
0.3
0.4
1.6
1.8
1.9
2.1
2.2
2.5
2.9
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.3
3.3
and then only if CSSC can not, the order will go outside. Let's compare the age
of China's merchant fleet and Japanese merchant fleet(table 4.7). The age of the
Chinese merchant fleet is 1.8 times older than the age of the Japanese merchant fleet.
Especially the general cargo ships are the worst case. It is obvious that China need
new ships more urgently than Japan. Furthermore, Chinese economic development is
the quickest in the world. The domestic demand is of much more potential in China
than in Japan.
4.4 Factor Condition
4.4.1 Manpower
China has a population of 1.14 billion, about 20% of the total world population,
according to 1990 census and a labor force of 697 million. The distribution of educated
labor force is not even. There are more skilled labor along the sea shore where most
of shipyards locate.
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Table 4.7: The age of Chinese and Japanese fleet[49]
Ship type Chinese Japanese C/J ratio
age age
Oil tankers 16.2 10.4 1.6
Chemical tankers 11.3 9.2 1.2
Liquid gas tankers 14.7 10.1 1.5
Bulk carriers 15.9 8.5 1.9
OBO carriers - 16.9
Container ships 11.4 7.7 1.5
General cargo ships 19.6 9.2 2.1
Passenger/Cargo ships 16.0 11.4 1.4
Average 17.9 9.7 1.8
Education
Education is very important for a country. High education will supply a potential for
accepting high technology to improve productivity. In fact, China has its tradition
of paying attention to education. Kids in China try their best to go to university,
because education will decide their life occupations and social status. Many Chinese
families are greatly concerned with the education of their children. Normally, after
nine years of general education, graduates are faced with two choices: first, to go to
general senior school and prepare to enter university; and second, to receive voca-
tional education or training. Some graduates enter specialized secondary technical
schools or vocational senior schools. while others to technical schools or to short-term
training courses and undergo vocational training.
Employment training centers have been set up by labor Bureaus to train young job-
seekers who are not able to enter higher schools providing various types of vocational
training in cities and towns. The training period is mainly for a short time, from
three months to one year. By the end of 1985, employment training centers run by
labor service companies all over the country reached a total of 1,345, where 1.77 mil-
lion persons had been trained, comprising 43 percent of the total employed people[42].
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Apprenticeship training is the traditional form of training of skilled workers in China.
Apprentices are trained by their masters at workplaces in production, and practice
what they have learned right at the place where they are apprentising. The training
period varies from two-to-three years, in accordance with the requirements of the
skills in different trades. during the training period, all apprentices receive a living
allowance and the same labor insurance and other material benefits as the regular
workers. They may become regular workers only after they pass an examination at
the end of the apprenticeship period.
The Chinese shipyards have their own technical schools. The training period for
junior middle-school graduates is three years, and for senior middle-school graduates
it is one or two years. Teaching consists of (a) general knowledge and theory of tech-
nology, and (b) practical work in workshops. The curricular include politics, general
knowledge, basic technology and specialized technology such as welding, shipfitting,
pipefitting, painting, chipping and etc. Practical work in each work shops is an im-
portant subject and generally accounts for 50 percent or more of the total hours of
training.
The top graduates will go to colleges. Since 1980 the annual growth rate of stu-
dents in all kinds of higher education institutions has been 8.3%. In 1991, 619,900
college students for regular and professional training courses were enrolled. Chinese
education is expanding more rapidly than even the most optimistic projections. How-
ever, if the country is to quadruple economic production by the year 2000, the annual
output from higher education is still far short of the demand for qualified manpower.
To solve this problem, the Chinese government instituted some radical changes in the
educational system. These changes give the educational system its flavor and provides
the means for the shipyards and associated industries to train their personnel. The
reform would involve government relinquishing (to the universities and industry) a
degree of control over college enrollment and job assignment after graduation. The
universities would gain the most power. Now for the universities would be the au-
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tonomy to accept any student sponsored by a funding organization or industry. The
universities would also be given more authorities over educational matters, such as
structuring curricular or selecting textbooks. The universities would also have more
say over funds received form the state and, for the first time, could raise funds on
their own. The universities were given control over their administrators to hire or fire
as they saw fit. Finally, they were given the freedom to solicit and engage in joint
research projects with industry or other organizations.
The new autonomy given to the universities helped make industry a more active
participant in education. Under the joint research program and industrial sponsor-
ship of student's program, industry began to work more closely with universities to fill
their educational needs. A direct interface was established between an employer, who
funded the education of a worker, and the university, that provides the education.
One program that evolved was commissioned enrollment, under which, shipbuilders
and other industries contract with local and national universities for the education
of selected employees. The contracts call for the university to train a set number of
students in the skills the industry needs. These students are then employed by the
client enterprise upon graduation. The student may or may not come from an existing
employee of the enterprise. If the student is not sent by the enterprise, the univer-
sity designates the student. In return, the enterprise pays the recurrent expenses for
each student and a considerable portion of the capital cost. By participating, the
university increases its capacity and creates a new source of funding. Besides better
educated workers, the industry can work with the universities to tailor new pro-
grams to better fill industry's needs[24]. Using this method, the shipyards and their
suppliers educate the majority of their workers who require post-secondary education.
There are three universities engaged in shipbuilding and two shipbuilding institutes.
In all, 3000 men and women graduate with backgrounds in shipbuilding every year[50].
Shanghai Jiao Tong University is worth mentioning, which is one of the best univer-
sities in China. Many professors got educated from Britain, U.S.A., Japan, Denmark
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etc. A large department of it was wholly engaged in shipbuilding equipped with ad-
vanced facilities filled with students graduate from top schools. Chinese president,
Jiang Zheming and the president of CSSC, Zhang Shou graduated from this univer-
sity. It has its own towing tank which is a member of Advisory council of ITTC.
Besides this university, there are lots of universities engaged in designing diesel en-
gines, auxiliary machinery, navigation instruments, communication equipment and
ship materials. Large shipyards also run their own ship designing institutes.
Compared with Japanese and South korea, I would say that Chinese education is
not as bad as what westerns think. Graduates from Chinese universities could com-
pete any graduates from all over the world. In Chinese shipyards the hired graduates
are put into workshops in one year, where they learn skills and techniques from se-
nior workers or supervisors. After one year, they have experienced in working in
each workshop of shipyards. In the course of training not only skill acquisition but
also moral training as one of the members of a communal body, an enterprise, are
considered to be of great importance. Since the new employee weathers the reality
shock easily and begins to learn how to work, deal with people, manage, resistance
to change, deal with the boss and the peer groups and get a sense of identity in the
organization, he or she is becoming a full-fledged member. And the big difference
between China and Japan is the training after they hire the graduates. Normally,
Chinese shipyards give a little chance of retraining those employees with university
degree. In the meantime, in Japanese shipyards, employees keep on being trained
through their worklife so that Japanese employees could get new technology. After
a certain period such as five years, Japanese employees with university background
will be more sophisticated than Chinese ones with the same background.
Labor System
Before reforms started, labor market in China was highly rigid. This was the result of
job assignments by central authorities and life long employment. Workers enjoyed the
"iron rice bowls" with complete security of employment. After 1978, the authorities
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recognized the need for a stronger link between compensation and productivity and
the need to give enterprises more flexibility in managing their workforce. To enhance
flexibility of enterprises, contract labor system was introduced in 1986. Under the
system, newly employed workers and staff would enter into contract with the enter-
prises, usually for a duration of three or five years. In general, enterprises have been
given greater autonomy in hiring and dismissing employees. In terms of geographical
mobility, restrictions have been eased by issuing temporary residence limits which
allow rural residents to work in the urban areas.
Under the Eighth Year Plan(covering the period 1991-95), the wage system of en-
terprise would be gradually moving from a uniform grading system to one based on
skills and requirements. In fact, workers are difficult to change jobs in China now, be-
cause workers welfare program were enterprise-based and were not transferable. This
is good for shipbuilding industry, because the know-how in the shipbuilding industry
needs the accumulation of experience over time. This employment policy definitely
helped build up the team of experienced working force.
Though the enterprises were given greater flexibility in terms of employment of work-
ers, they were hesitant to exercise the autonomy. They were reluctant to dismiss
workers due to the strong reactions and fierce resistance form the workers and sym-
pathetic colleagues. In China's shipbuilding industry, the contract employee's status
was as secured as that of a lifetime employee under the old systems. This led to the
problem of underemployed in the shipyards. In contrast to China, Japan lacks work-
force in shipbuilding industry, which unfortunately is a labor-intensive industry. In
Japan, the image of shipbuilding during the past decade of decline is proving to be a
major problem for Japan's shipbuilders as the industry experiences better times. The
problem is often summarized in the three Japanese words kiken, kitanaei and kitsui,
commonly known as the "three Ks", which describe the industry as being "danger-
ous" "dirty" and "hardwork". School leavers, more importantly, graduates no longer
find the industry an acceptable career and thus the country's shipyards find that the
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average age of their workforces continues to rise, and that they are unable to recruit
new workers to meet demand. To make the matter worse, during the depressed time,
Japanese shipyards introduced a no-recruitment policy. Actually, most yards in Japan
are looking into ways of increasing the level of automation and identifying what tasks
robots could do. The objective is three-fold: more mechanization will make up for
the labor shortage while also increasing, or maintaining, productivity and efficiency.
It's introduction will also make the working environment more attractive to potential
recruits. However, what every shipyard wants is the unobtainable-the robotic solu-
tion to building large sections. No one can envisage this concept happening so the
yards have to confine themselves to the areas where robotisation is both practical and
reliable.
The Japanese industry is facing increasing production costs, caused mainly by the se-
rious shortage of skilled labor. With workers being lured away from shipbuilding into
other areas of heavy industry such as car manufacture by higher wages, the Japanese
shipbuilders have had to raise wages in order to keep their skilled workers. The age
profile of Japan's shipyard workers is on average early forties[37]. This means that
there is a vast of amount of expertise available, but clearly in 20-25 years time, around
2015, that will have worked through the system. For at least some years in Japan,
shipbuilding was seen as a sunset industry by young people, who do find shipyard
conditions of noise, dust, exposure to the weather unattractive working conditions
but prefer office or light factory work.
There are three types of basic salary in Japanese companies, namely, basic salary
based on job classification (SHOKUMUKYU), basic salary based on job capability
(SHOKUNIKYU) and basic salary based on seniority (NENKOKYU). Most Japanese
companies accept the combination of NENKIKYU and SHOKUNIKYU[25]. As wages
are tied to years of service, obviously the increasing average age of the Japanese work-
force inevitably increase the annual wage bill. It is clearly difficult to obtain an "av-
erage" wage level of a shipyard worker as it is dependent on so many factors; however
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the consensus appears to hover around 5 million Yen/yr which equates to about US$
40,000/yr. However, there is a pro rota increase in the number of sub-contractors,
now a figure of 17,124, even a little bit over regular craft and skilled workers, a figure
of 15211[12]. This is seen to reflect the builders' policy of spreading the workload
when busy, without increasing their number of full-time employees. Now in China
shipyards, sub-contractors are also used because full time workers don't like to do
some dirty and dangerous jobs.
Employee Profile
This section profiles the workforce in a typical Chinese shipyard by examining the
workforce in a medium sized shipyard. The data are shipyard non-specific. Instead of
illustrating the actual conditions found in one Chinese shipyard, the data presented
are an average of conditions found in medium sized shipyards throughout China. The
section emphasizes the character of the workforce instead of just listing skills em-
ployed. The section does not try to describe all the skills utilized in the Chinese
shipyard.
Figure 4-4 provides an overview of the entire employee breakdown for medium sized
Chinese shipyard. The administrators include managers, foremen, and staffs. The
following points should be highlighted. Compared with other world shipyards, Chi-
nese shipyards have a significant shortage of staff personnel and engineers[51]. Ad-
ditionally, Chinese shipyards tend to have a proportionally large indirect labor force
compared with other shipyards around the world. The shortage of staff personnel
and engineers cause inefficiencies in that planning, coordination, and design work do
not receive the optimum degree. This translates into more problems in operations. A
large indirect labor force is inefficient because their role is strictly support. Because
each worker is an added cost to production, if that worker does not add more to
production than his cost, the efficiency of the yard is reduced.
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Figure 4-4: Chinese Shipyard Employee Breakdown[51]
4.4.2 Capital
Finance can be broken down into two general areas: shipyard finance for capital
acquisitions and the capital to finance each shipbuilding project. Each is critical
important to the well being of the shipyard. Without a source of funds for capital
acquisitions, the shipyards would be unable to modernize and would lack the equip-
ment and tooling required to build ships in a competitive fashion. Project financing
applies principally to the buyers. Normally, shipyards do not engage in speculative
building. The shipyard only begins a new project after it has a firm contract. But
project financing is a major shipyard concern in that if buyers are unable to secure
financing to purchase ships, shipyard orders will fall and the yards will sit idle, ab-
sorbing heavy losses due to fixed costs.
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Employee type number proportion
Direct & Asst. Foreman 2376 0.72
Administrators 231 0.07
Technicians & Engineers 198 0.06
Indirect & Asst. Foremen 495 0.15
Total 3300 1.00
Ratio
Direct labor/Indirect Labor 2.6
Direct workers & Asst. Foreman/Indirect Labor 4.8
Administrators/direct Workers & Asst. Foremen 0.1
Managers & Foremen/Direct workers & Asst. Foremen 0.06
The employees can be broken down further to:
Employee type number proportion
Managers and Foremen 146 0.044
Staff and Engineers 316 0.096
Chinese shipyards have four sources of funds for capital acquisitions:
* net after-tax shipyard income
* capital supplied by the CSSC/State
* bank borrowing
* capital supplied though joint ventures
Acquisitions from cash flows (after tax income) and bank borrowing are treated in
the same way that such transactions are handled in the west. For cash purchases an
asset is debited and listed on the balance sheet and cash(or its equivalent) is cred-
ited. For bank loans, the loan is listed as a liability and a schedule of payment is
arranged for both principal and interest. Terms of most loans are very generous.
Depreciation of assets is used in China with depreciation charges made against net
income. Straight line depreciation is the most commonly used method of depreciation.
The Bank of China is a frequent source of loan capital. Additionally, regional trust
companies tend to provide smaller loans but are important in that they help open
up diversified channels for sources of funds. This loan source is important because
it both speeds up loan processing and reduces the competition for smaller, more re-
gional borrowers. Investment trust companies may be organized according to regions
or industries or trades. The Dalian Municipality Investment Trust Company is one
regional trust company that has been extremely successful as a new source of capital
for expansion and modernization.
Capital supplied by the CSSC and the state is treated as an infusion of equity funds
and no repayment is required. To get such an investment, the enterprise is required
to submit a plan showing how the investment will increase profits, and return on
investment to the CSSC/state. Of course, the more attractive the enterprise can
make the investment look, the greater the chance it has of getting the funds. The
CSSC does have criteria that it uses to allocate such investment funds with "return"
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or "interest on money" an important consideration. Another criteria includes the
relative importance of the enterprise. The state will provide the necessary financial
support to the technological transformation of the old industrial bases, but it would
not be possible to depend on state support alone since, in reality, the state is unable
to shoulder the whole burden. The final source of financial available to Chinese ship-
yards is from foreign corporations. In this type of venture China essentially allows
a foreign corporation the chance to buy into the Chinese market with technology,
training, and facilities[19]
4.4.3 Raw materials
The major portion (60-70 percent) of the total cost of a ship consists of inputs such
as steel, engines, and other components. Steel is a critical material cost item in
ship construction. Most steel used in merchant shipbuilding is low carbon, mild, or
ordinary-strength steel. Higher carbon and other alloy steels are also used. Struc-
tural steels used for commercial construction in the world market must be certified
by a certain ship-class society. Despite China is the third largest steel production
country, since the major problem with Chinese steel production was that the mills
just could not consistently produce batches of quality steel, most of this steel has to
be imported from Japan or South Korea, because the ship owners are much in doubt
about the reliability of the steel made in PRC. Rising costs of imported materials
combined with erratic delivery of them conspired to lengthen completion times at
Chinese yards. The drain on hard currency imposed by the need to pay for the 50-60
percent of equipment that still must be imported for the more sophisticated vessels,
continues to place severe limits on the competitive position of China's yards in re-
lation to shipbuilding industries in either the more affluent AICs or bountiful NICs.
However, since China has had quality control program in steel production, overall
steel quality will get better in the future.
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Chinese government realized this problem and then decided to invest in new modern
steel mill. The Baoshan Iron & Steel complex(BISC) is the largest single construction
project to be undertaken since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949.
BISC boasts an annual capacity of 6.5 million tons of pig iron, 6.71 million tons of
steel and 4.22 million tons of steel materials. So, the complex's current capacity of
some 7 million tons of steel a year represent no more than one tenth of the nation's
total steel output. Furthermore, BISC's most important contribution to China lies
not in the quantity of the steel it provides but in quality. Although China's steel
output has continues to grow in recent years, the quality and variety are still lacking
and the country has to import specific types of high quality steel material. Nearly
all steel produced domestically is of an ordinary variety while steel demanded by
shipbuilding, automobile, oil and other industries must be of a high quality. Since
BISC has strict production standards, which are higher than those used internation-
ally, and required all its products be of the same quality as similar foreign ones, its
ship hull steel has been certificated by six ship-class societies which are Germany,
Norway, British, the United State, French and China[26]. BISC will contribute much
to China's shipbuilding industry.
4.4.4 Technology
Physical Characteristics of Shipyard
In fact, it is difficult to compare two shipyards in different countries. The reason
is different shipyards build different ships in terms of size and type and sometimes
luckily enough they build the similar ships but in different time. I think that we had
better choose the latter choice. As I pointed out in chapter 3, shipbuilding industry
is comparatively mature. So the improvement of product process in shipbuilding in-
dustry is not measured as by day or by month as in hi-tech regime.
The baseline ship which Chinese Hudong Shipyard (HSY) and Japanese Kawasaki
Kobe Shipyard (KHI) built was the PD214 general mobilization ship described in the
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Table 4.8: Size of production facilities at
3mm
Hudong
Production Category (A)
Fabrication 310,680
Sub-Assembly 314,330
Assembly 335,190
Erection 203,480
Total 1,163,680
Hudong and Kobe Shipyard(ft 2 )[10][9]
Kobe Ratio
(B) (A/B)
83,510 3.72
67,790 4.64
139,800 2.4
230,400 0.88
521,500 2.23
1978 MarAd report[l]. The problem is time. A contract signed on January 1, 1980 in
KHI, while on January 1, 1986 in HSY. Some might argue that the six-year difference
in when the ships were to be built would invalidate the comparisons. I would argue
that six years is fine because the reason is law of diminishing returns that China's
productivity will increase much faster than Japan's. There is a limit to the produc-
tivity improvements that can be achieved from compute-aided manufacturing and
robotics in the near future because of the nature of ship construction. For example,
Mitsubishi expects less manual involvement in welding and painting and hopes to
automate these areas as much as possible. It feels that the modernization already
carried out has reduced manhours by 50%, so the potential productivity benefits of
any newly introduced mechanization will not have anything like the same effect. The
easy welding work has already been automated but the more complex jobs will be
much more difficult to mechanize. Furthermore, the objective of the comparisons is
to get some idea of the relative difference between Japanese and Chinese shipyards.
Table 4.8 presents the square footage tallies for the different facilities for two yards.
HSY has nearly 310,680ft2 for prefabrication and fabrication operations; KHI has
about 84,000ft2 dedicated for this service. Hudong's space availability is 3.72 times
that utilized by KHI. For the assembly operations Hudong again utilized significantly
more space than does KHI. As table 4.8 shows, HSY's subassembly operations com-
prise 314,330ft2 while KHI's subassembly activities requires only 68,000ft 2. This
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is a difference of 4.6 times in favor of Hudong. The final assembly operations have
335,000ft2 of space; KHI utilizes only 140,000ft2 . Hudong dedicates over two times
as much space to this production activities as does KHI. The only space that KHI
uses more than Hudong is erection space, the ration is 0.88 in favor of KHI. Overall,
Hudong production facilities encompass about 1,163,680ft2 at HSY, and KHI facili-
ties cover 522,000ft 2 . The difference is significant in that KHI's space use is only 40
percent of Hudong's. It is obvious that Hudong's bottleneck has too small erection
space.
There is significant ground movement of the blocks at Hudong. Depending on the
type of block being manufactured, the travel distance is 6 to 15 times greater at
Hudong than KHI-Kobe. KHI-KObe appears to have more of a consistency of capac-
ity at each of the area than does Hudong. In Hudong, you will see the large amount
of pipe and structural material in the storage lot because the national planning sys-
tem permits the ordering of material only two times per year. So the inventory cost
in China is much higher than in Japan. Moreover, that Hudong has less extensive
covered structure results in lower productivity because of less comfortable condition.
Productivity
There are major differences in the shipyards'operational capabilities. The most sig-
nificant differences are found in the cutting operations, welding operations, pipe shop
operations, CAD/CAM operations and painting operation. Automatic and semi-
automatic welding operations are more extensive at KHI than at Hudong. KHI's
pipe shop is nearly fully automated; Hudong's pipe fabrication is mostly manual and
is also segmented into three separate operating locations thus reducing potential ben-
efits from economics of scale. KHI has utilized CAD/CAM throughout its operations
satisfactorily. Hudong, on the other hand, utilized CAD/CAM software for a short
time. KHI has adopted robots through its paint shop operations.
Hudong requires significantly more direct man-hours to build the PD214 than does
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Table 4.9: Man-hours required to build five PD214, Hudong and KHI(000 M/H)
SHIP NUMBER
ACTIVITIES 1st 2st 3st 4st 5st 5-ship Average
HSY KHI HSY KHI HSY KHI HSY KHI HSY KHI HSY KHI
Mold Loft & Prefabrication 141 32 122 12 121 6 121 4 121 1 125 11
Hull Assembly 491 130 478 126 471 122 462 119 457 118 472 123
Hull Erection 347 96 339 93 327 90 324 88 322 87 331 91
Fitting & Outfitting 204 56 196 54 190 53 189 52 189 51 194 53
Piping 170 116 162 112 157 109 156 107 155 106 160 110
Machinery (Sheet Metal) 261 58 247 56 245 55 243 53 241 53 248 55
Electrical 119 31 112 30 111 29 109 29 108 28 112 29
Painting (Insulation) 212 68 208 65 202 64 201 62 197 62 204 64
Testing & Trials 30 2 28 2 27 2 28 2 28 2 28 2
Design Engineering 248 51 25 11 22 2 20 0 17 0 66 13
Miscellaneous 103 70 80 44 82 37 77 34 73 29 83 43
Grand Total 2326 710 1997 605 1955 569 1930 550 1908 537 2023 594
KHI. The direct man-hour estimates for both yards for each of the five ships are shown
in Table 4.9. For all the activities, Hudong requires an average of 2023 thousand man-
hours for each ship, which is about 340 percent greater than KHI's requirements for
each of the five ships. On the basis of the total direct man-hours, which includes both
production and engineering, Hudong is about 3.27 times greater than KHI on the first
ship ( 2326000 man-hours versus 710000 man-hours), and about 3.4 times greater for
the five ship average. Relative to Table 4.9, it must be remembered that Hudong's
estimate was based on production procedures in place as of January 1, 1986-nearly
six years after KHI's contract date. During the six-year period, KHI has probably
continued to improve its productivity making the actual difference in productivity for
the two yards greater than shown in Table 4.9. However, the labor costs in China is
almost around one-twentieth of those in Japan. Furthermore, China has such a huge
labor resource that it seems to impossible for the wage to increase very quickly. So
the difference of wage between two countries will last a definite long time.
The effects of learning on productivity improvement are shown in Table 4.10. The
production activities show approximately the same rate-of-charge for the two ship-
yards over the five ship series, with the fifth ship requiring only 91 to 93 percent of
the man-hours estimated on the first ship, except the hull production, where the esti-
mated manpower requirements for the fifth ship is only 80 percent of the first at KHI,
and 92 percent of the first at HSY. On a total man-hours basis, KHI's reductions are
greater than Hudong's. The Japanese yard needs only 76 percent of man-hours for
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Table 4.10: Effects of experience on productivity improvement[10][9]
% of 1st ship man-hours
Activities/Ships of Seriers 2nd ship 3rd ship 4th ship 5th ship 5-Average
Hull Production
Hudong 96 94 93 92 95
KHI 90 84 82 80 87
Outfitting
Hudong 95 93 92 92 95
KHI 96 95 93 91 95
Painting & Insulating
Hudong 98 95 95 93 96
KHI 96 94 91 91 94
Design Engineering
Hudong 10 8.8 8 6.9 26.7
KHI 22 4 0 0 25
Total Man-hours
Hudong 86 84 83 82 87
KHI 85 80 77 76 84
the fifth ship as for the first, whereas Hudong's reduction is only 82 percent of the
first. In the hull production, KHI's budget decreased greatly from the second ship's 90
percent of the first ship to the third ship's 84 percent of the first ship, while Hudong's
budget decreased mildly from 96 percent to 94 percent. In the design engineering,
KHI spent 22% man-hours of the first ship design on the second ship, but HSY needed
10 percent man-hours on the second ship. After the second ship, KHI was confident
about its design and almost did not change the design, while HSY had to improve
the design to the similar degree as the second one. Japanese improvement for the
follow-on ships was greater than Hudong's on the basis of percentage improvement.
As Table 4.10 shows, KHI projected that the third ship would have a total man-hours
expenditure of about 80 percent of the first ship; the estimate for the same ship at
Hudong was about 84 percent of the first ship.
Research and Development
CSSC operates 37 research institutes. In all, CSSC employed a work force of about
300,000 ranging from laborers and shipyard workers to naval architects and scientists.
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Important contributions have been and are being made by CSSC's research institu-
tions. A major one is the China Ship Scientific Research Center(CSSRC) in Wuxi,
Jiangsu province, east China. As the largest shipbuilding research and development
center, it has been engaged in ship hydrodynamic and structural experiments and
research for nearly 30 years. It is now equipped with the following major facilities:
* Deep water towing tank: total length 474 m; width of the middle portion 14 m;
water depth 7m; maximum speed of the two carriages 20 and 15 m/s respec-
tively.
* Rotating arm facility: diameter of basin 48 m; water depth 4.5 m; maximum
angular velocity of the arm 1 rad/s.
* Seakeeping basin: length of the basin 69 m; width 46 m; water depth 4m;
maximum speed of the carriage 8 m/s.
* Cavitation tunnel: length of the working section 3.2m; diameter of working
section 0.8 m; maximum velocity of flow 20 m/s; minimum cavitation number
0.15.
* Low-speed wind tunnel: length of the test 8.5 m; diameter 3m maximum wind
speed 100m/s; routing testing speed 60 m/s.
CSSRC also has a ship structure testing facility, ship structure vibration testing fa-
cility, impact and vibration basin, photoelastic laboratory, simulation facilities for
deepsea environment tests, etc. at its disposal. As a member of the Advisory Coun-
cil of ITTC, it has formed close ties through technical cooperations and established
academic exchanges with worldwide research and development.
A major ship design center in China is the Marine Design and Research Institute
of China(MARIC), based in Shanghai. With a technical force of over one thousand
specialists, this institute has been providing the shipbuilding industry with ship de-
signs for decades. It has designed more than five hundred types of ships for domestic
clients over the past 30 years. Recently, it has designed bulk carriers, containerships
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Table 4.11: Research, Selected Indicators, 1980-90[18]
Share Major
in GNP R&D R&D Major
R&D personnel achieved inventions
(%) (1,000) (no.) (no.)
1980 1.4 323 2,687 109
1981 1.3 337 3,371 123
1982 1.3 372 4,186 153
1983 1.4 328 5,397 212
1984 1.4 335 10,615 264
1985 1.2 336 10,472 185
1986 1.2 366 14,915 26
1987 1.0 314 11,800 225
1988 0.8 307 16,552 217
1989 - 297 20,278 150
1990 0.7 291 26,829 224
and offshore anchor handling/supply tugs for foreign owners[13].
Technological progress is now the feature of world economic development. Notable
achievements in R&D have been made in China since 1980, although its contribution
to output growth appears to have been quite limited. R&D funding as a percentage
of GNP was relatively low by international standards and declined from 1.4 percent
in 1980 to 0.7 percent in 1990. The shares for Japan, South Korea were 2.8 percent
and 1.8 percent. Table 4.11 also shown that the technical manpower engaged in R&D
was in decline from 1986. However, despite the slow growth of inputs, the system has
been productive and the rate of increase in the number of major R&D achievements
for exceeds that of its funding. Current design studies focus on seven ship types,
including LPG carriers, chemical tankers and VLCCs with energy-saving features.
Other areas of interest are selfdischargeing vessels and hovercraft[38]. Improvements
in design and production efficiency are sought from computers. In the early 1980s the
CSSC initiated the first phase of CASIS-1, a project establishing an integrated com-
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puter system for shipbuilding. The system involves a range of disciplines, including
price quotations, preliminary designs, hull construction, piping, power calculations
and power units, propeller design and the ship's critical path productive analysis.
The wide adoption of CASIS-1 is claimed to have improved quality and shortened
design and production periods. It also allows the CSSC to respond more readily
to changing market conditions and demands. The CASIS-1 price quotation system
allows two personnel to estimate the price for a project and print out a quote with
standard information an diagrams in 30 minutes. By September, 1988 the system had
been applied to generate quotations for 100 newbuilding enquires, including bulkers,
tankers and multi-purpose cargo vessels. The CSSC believes the speed and quality
of the response have a significant influence in translating the inquiry into a con-
tract. Compute-aided methods have helped reduce overall design times by one to
three months. Different proposals and layouts can be easily assessed, promoting a
more optimum final result. Most of the major Chinese yards have installed compute-
based hull building and piping generation systems. The former element is capable
of producing hull outlines, expanding hull plates, designing sections and computing
for digital-control paper tape cutting. The piping element can automatically design
pipe layouts, check for interference and produce construction diagrams for component
parts.
The two system elements in conjunction with digital control cutters and pipe bending
machines have reportedly shortened the preparation period by two to three months.
The process enables a 15-20% saving in the time for hull assembly and welding, and
achieves saving of 150-200t of steel plate. Computers have also allowed the yards
to hand over complete sets of drawings and documents simultaneously with the de-
livery of the ship. (The former manual method often meant that the material was
not available until some weeks later; some yards even had to subcontract the work
overseas)
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4.5 Related and Supporting Industries
. Shipbuilding industry uses materials and goods from more than 50 other industries,
including machinery, iron and steel, electronics, chemicals, and furniture. So the
overall industry background is important for shipbuilding industry.
4.5.1 Industry Milieu
In 1949, China's economy was overwhelmingly agricultural. Her few dozen mechani-
cally powered factories and mines, some controlled and managed by foreigners, pro-
vided only a minute fraction of total product. Today, China is a rising industrial
power whose economy displays many features associated with Kuznets's concept of
modern economic growth. Industry is now the largest economic sector in terms of
output value, although agriculture continues to dominate in employment(table 4.4).
Industry between 1949 to 1978
China had changed from being an essentially rural, peasant economy in 1949 to one
in which industry was very significant. The share of industry in national income had
grown from 20 percent in 1952 to 49 percent in 1978.
The first decade after 1949 was one of rapid output growth, massive investment, and
marked expansion of the potential for qualitative change in China's producer sec-
tor. The producer industries, including the machinery, metallurgy, chemical, building
materials, energy, and mining sectors, are industries whose output consists primarily
of intermediate and capital goods. In reviewing these years, both Chinese and for-
eign observers have stressed the contribution of former Soviet technology, advice, and
managerial systems to industrial progress. The 156 heavy industrial projects carried
out with the assistant of the former Soviet Union[47]. Gradual completion of indus-
trial construction projects, brought forth a steady stream of products that China had
been unable to manufacture in the past. The key feature of industrial development
during the 1950s, however, is neither the sharp rise in output volume nor the equally
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Table 4.12: Increase in national income per 100 yuan of accumulation[45]
(current prices) Year Increase(yuan)
1953-57 32
1958-62 1
1963-65 57
1966-70 26
1971-75 16
1976-80 24
1981-85 41
striking costs of this expansion. Together with the experience acquired during the
FFYP years and the new technology embodied in imported equipment, these insti-
tutional changes represent a gathering of forces with a potential for qualitative gains
extending far beyond the limited achievements of the FFYP years. Industrial growth
has continued since 1957, but at a less rapid pace than was achieved between 1949
and 1957 because of the break with the former Soviet Union and the poor policy.
Actually, China at that time overemphasized heavy industries, but at least the in-
dustrial base was built to make economic development possible.
Industry After 1978
Serious reform of the Chinese economy can be dated from the historic Third Plenum
of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP in December 1978. Between then
and the late 1980s substantial changes occurred. The overall industrial growth rate
changed little after 1978. However, major changes occurred in the balance of indus-
trial growth, of which the most striking was the reversal in the growth rates of heavy
and light industry, reflecting China's move away from a Stalinist economy. Much
capacity shifted from heavy to light industrial production. Moreover, the overall
productivity of capital almost certainly increased(table 4.12) so that less output was
required of the capital goods industries to produce a unit of final product. However,
China didn't go to extremes like before. China also pay attention to investment in
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heavy industry. In 1991, China produced 71 million tons of steel ranking 4th among
the steel producers of the world after the former Soviet Union, Japan and the United
States[48]. In fact, steel is necessary for lots of industry, especially for shipbuilding
industry.
China has nine major plants and hundreds of smaller facilities spread across the coun-
try. A majority of these plants were built with Soviet technology in the 1950s(which
was not modern even at the time of construction) and are relatively inefficient by west-
ern standards. The three largest facilities are Anshan, Shanghai and Wuhan. The
Baoshan Iron and Steel complex, located near Shanghai, was to be China's showcase
of modern iron and steel technology. The plant was contracted to be built in 1979.
Now it can produce special steels which had to import from aboard before.
According to the 1985 industrial census, China's industrial capital was relatively
young: 38.9 percent had been built in the 1980s, 43 percent in 1970s and only 18.1
percent before 1970. However, in China's case, this may not be a reliable indicator of
quality. Although the bulk of equipment is relatively new, it does not embody up-to-
date technology. Equipment built in the 1970s actually uses technology of the 1950s,
and also the quality of machinery produced during the Cultural Revolution was poor.
Consequently, only one-third of the equipment was technologically advanced, with
two-thirds obsolete.
4.5.2 Marine Engineering
Marine engineering is very important for shipbuilding industry. There are two rea-
sons, one is cost and the other is delivery time. The ship's engine accounts for about
15% of the total production cost of a ship. It is difficult to imagine how a major
shipbuilding country can face the problem that most of engines and other stuffs have
to be imported from other country. In that case, the shipyards will be difficult to
control the delivery time, and the fluctuation of the exchange rate.
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CSSC's 18 marine diesel and diesel accessory plants are designed to produce high-,
medium-, and low-speed diesel engines. There are also factories making marine power
stations, navigational equipment, deck equipment, instruments and meters and all
other auxiliary ship machinery.
CSSC has begun to produce diesels and marine equipment with technology imported
since 1978 from industrially-developed countries under manufacturing licenses. The
new engines and machinery have been approved by international classification so-
cieties, and are now being fitted on ships for export. The up-to-date technology
introduced under 15 license agreements and three co-production contracts including
equipment for manufacturing of low, medium and medium-high speed marine diesel
engines purchased from Sulzer Brothers of Switzwerland, Societed' Etudes de Ma-
chines Thermiqurs of France, B&W Diesel A/S of Denmark, M.A.N of the federal
Republic of Germany and Daihatsu of Japan; exhaust-gas turbochargers from Brown
Boveri & Company of Swizwerland; coupling, dampers and deck cranes from Dr.-ING.
Beislinger & Co. and Liebherr-Work Nensing Ges. of Austria; marine gearboxes from
Lohmann & Stolterpoht of the Federal Republic of Germany; forging technology of
continuous grain flow for crankshaft from Japan Steel Works; cargo-handling equip-
ment form MacGregor Cargo Handling of France; marine hydraulic deck machinery
and hydraulic steering gear from Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co. and
Kawaski Heavy Industries of Japan; alternators for ship power stations form siemens
of West Germany; cartridges and hydraulic cylinders from Sperry Vickers of the
United States; and sewage treatment systems, incinerators and marine system boilers
from A/S Atlas and Alborg Vaerft A/S of Denmark. Over 40 licences have already
been arranged in the 1980s[38], allows, for example, the local production of leading
engine designs, transmissions, deck cranes, propellers and cargo access gear. Ac-
cording to the 1992 Chinese Machinery Statistics, most of the 12 export ships in new
order except the special technology required, will adopt diesel engines made in China.
However, in the global shipbuilding industry, Japanese suppliers play an important
role in determining the competitiveness of shipbuilders else in the world. Because
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of long-established relations, Japanese suppliers are believed by many observers to
supply products to their own nation's shipbuilders at lower prices than those offered
to foreign shipbuilders.
4.6 Government Intervention
Shipbuilding is an integral part of China's maritime policy. Zhou Enlai, whose in-
fluence motivated every aspect of that policy, saw the development of domestic ship-
building as a highly labor-intensive industry that China required for economic growth.
In his speeches he pointed out that ships built in national shipyards would
* strengthen the domestic transportation structure;
* contribute to the transportation of China's foreign trade;
* earn and conserve foreign exchange by helping to reduce dependence on charters
of foreign-owned ship; and'
* eventually, become an export commodity of increasing importance to the na-
tion's economy.
In the late 70s China began a program to catch up with the rest of the world techno-
logically. The essence of the program involved acquiring foreign technology through
purchase. But, foreign exchange was a scarce resource in China. In shipbuilding China
saw the opportunity to develop an existing industry and to generate badly needed for-
eign exchange[27]. If China could sell ships in world markets, it could use the revenues
generated from those sales to fund the modernization effort. Former Chinese Premier
Zhao Ziyang stressed the need to increase exports to generate foreign exchange in
support of the modernization: "Earning more foreign exchange by increasing exports
is the key to expanding economic trade and technological exchange with foreign coun-
tries". Shipbuilding, then, was part of the answers to China's dilemma of trying to
97
catch the rest of the world economically and technologically. Shipbuilding exports
would generate the foreign exchange that China would use to buy new modern tech-
nology as well as to educate the Chinese who would be able to implement that new
technology into Chinese life and the economy.
For years the world shipbuilding industry has been seriously hurt by a glut of over-
building. In this climate new ship prices have fallen because of significant financial
provided by the builder or the builder's government. Additionally, credit terms have
become very favorable to the buyer in an effort to attract new orders. For any nation
to seriously compete in the world market they must conform to this marketing policy
of low prices and generous credit(Lloyd's List, 1986-1987). Essentially, five sources
of financing exist for buyers of Chinese ships. These sources are the Chinese govern-
ment, the CSSC, the regional shipbuilding corporation under the CSSC, the Bank of
China, and foreign banks or financial institutions. Terms of financing are very similar
for all sources. Typically, the financing institution provides a low interest, fixed rate
loan that covers 75 to 85% of the shipbuilding contract. A typical arrangement is the
agreement negotiated in 1983 between the Bank of China and the Express Shipping
Management Company of Hong Kong. In this agreement
the Bank of China provided a buyer's export credit(to)... the Express
Shipping Management Co... The credit is to facilitate a U.S. $20 million
order for four ships of less than 10,000 dwt each, placed with the Zhonghua
Shipyard in Shanghai... The credit...covers 75-85% of the shipbuilding
contract. The loan is to be based in U.S. dollars and is repayable every
six months at 8.5% fixed annual belongs to the buyers.
The China State Shipbuilding Corporation is committed to the idea of assigning
first priority to fulfilling the needs of COSCO, the monopoly domestic shipping or-
ganization. Furthermore, the government's stated shipping policy is to carry all of
its domestic waterborne trade and as much of its foreign trade as possible in Chi-
nese flag ships. CSSC is a state-owned company which is obviously controlled by
the government. In China, navy needs new ships. Navy's building could adjust the
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relation of the demand and supply. CSSC contributes to China's defense by build-
ing the ROMEO class submarine, the JIANGNAN Class frigate combatant ship, the
JIANGHU Class frigates, the KANZHU Class auxiliary-type vessels for the navy.
China's participation in the select nuclear-submarine club (with boats built at the
Huludao Shipyard near Dalian) could prove that its capability has improved a lot.
Not to be overlooked is the sale of warships to outside. For example, Hudong Ship-
yard pulled off something of a coup during 1989 in selling four Jianghu V-class missile
frigate to Thailand.
4.7 Conclusion
The condition which exist in China are somewhat similar to those which existed in
Japan in the early fifties, that is, plentiful low-cost labor and a market which seems to
have no end. For China, an appreciable market consists of needs for its own coastal,
riverine, and ocean-going service. With such work opportunities, conditions are per-
fect for developing shipbuilding industry as happened during the sixties in Japan.
Though national advantage in shipbuilding is a reflection of a well-functioning "Di-
amond", the whole system is rarely in place at the start. An advantage in a single
determinant or two often provides the initial impetus for formation of a compara-
tive advantage for the shipbuilding industry formation in one nation. As a starting
point of view, China has advantage compared with Japan and Korea in shipbuild-
ing industry at least in labor cost. In 1950s when Japan entered the shipbuilding
market, the average salary of a shipbuilding worker was much lower than that of
the West European countries. In 1976, when South Korea started their export drive
in shipbuilding, the average hourly earnings of shipyard workers were 1/4 of West
Germany and about 1/6 of Japan. Even today, average hourly earnings of shipyard
workers in China is only 1/20 of that in Japan. Furthermore, comparing with the
situation at the early stages of shipbuilding development in South korea and other
NIC countries, the shipbuilding industry in China was already established through
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the effects of several decades in buildings for its own needs. When China started to
export new ships, it could get steel plate supply from its own plants, not like South
Korea, at the beginning it depended on the import from Japan. And also China had
already built its own ships for forty years, the workers had experience in shipbuilding,
although at that time,only domestic ships were built. Meanwhile, at a similar stage of
development, Korea shipyards only produced simple boats, most of them wooden. In
short, China has a higher starting point than other countries, which gain comparative
advantage in shipbuilding.
Applying Michael Porter's theory, we could see two very important strengths in the
China's shipbuilding cluster. One is special domestic and foreign trade demand. The
other is endless source of inexpensive labor. In fact, in China's case, with such a rich
source of population, the market seems infinite. The growth rate of foreign trade
and domestic market show that there is great potential for shipping. In my opinion,
the economic recession in Japan, U.S and Europe helps China attract lots of foreign
capital to invest in China, because there are few places outside China, where the re-
turn of capital investment is better than in China. That China will benefit from the
capital from outside will result in the investment environment being more attractive
to the world. Even though the world economy recovers after a certain period of time,
the investment milieu in China will have been at least as good as elsewhere in the
world because of the economic development during the recession period. So that the
demand of shipping will be huge will supply the source of the shipbuilding. Home
market demand is growing rapidly in shipbuilding industry in which other nations'
markets has begun to level off. Booming domestic demand is stimulating the indus-
try to invest aggressively in large, efficient facilities with the latest technology while
other countries are slowing down because of the world economic recession. While
world shipyards are plagued by overcapacity in shipbuilding facilities, Chinese ship-
yards do not have sufficient capacity to meet the nation's present requirements for
new ships. The heavy investment will decrease the gap of productivity from other
shipbuilding nations. In fact, China's planners have set a target for shipyard capacity
100
to reach 4 million tons by the end of the century[21]
On the other hand, shipbuilding is a labor-intensive industry. According to Mr.
Yoshio Miwa, Managing Director of Hitachi Zosen, over 50% of ship construction
could not be automated[58]. So at the present of level of technology, labor in ship-
building is very important, although automation could increase productivity to com-
pensate labor shortage or high cost of labor to some degree. But the modernization
already reduced manhour a lot, so the potential productivity benefits of any newly
introduced mechanization will not function to the same degree like before. In anther
words, at present technology, labor is still a very important factor that decides the
competitiveness in shipbuilding. As I said before, large source of labor will make it
impossible for the wage to increase very quickly like in South Korea. The reason is
simple: it is like that the temperature of sea water is more difficult to change than
one in lakes or in streams. The low labor cost will last longer and in the meantime,
the speed of productivity is comparatively lower. This is where China's comparative
advantage lies.
Although the related and supporting industry in China are not as strong as the
two factors I mentioned before, it is not too bad. Furthermore, it is growing rapidly.
According to the 1993 Chinese Machinery Statistic, most of the export ships have
adopted engines made in China. In 1991, Sulzer 5RTA52 made in the Shanghai Yard
and Dalian Yard exported to German yards. This is the first time for China to export
diesel engines to foreign yards. Besides, the steel made in Baoshan Iron and Steel
Complex has been certificated by six ship classification societies. Furthermore, lots of
advanced production process are being adopted by Chinese shipyards, namely, zone
outfitting method, CAD outfitting and dynamic production management.
In terms of government intervention, China has a great advantage. As we analyzed
before, shipbuilding industry does need protection when it is young. In fact, Chi-
nese shipping policy is to carry all of its domestic waterborne trade and as much
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of its foreign trade as possible in Chinese flag ships. Chinese government does al-
low shipowners in China to build the ships that Chinese shipyards are able to build.
This will guarantee the large domestic demand in Chinese shipyards. As a would-be
superpower taking the place of the former Soviet Union, China's need for a navy
can protect and support its commercial interests and defend its major coast. This
will guarantee the government's commitment to supporting the shipbuilding industry.
However, there is lot of room for Chinese shipbuilding to learn from advanced ship-
building nations in areas such as quality control, productivity, and production man-
agement. Competitive advantage can come quickly if a nation either possess advan-
tages in several determinants right from the start or rapidly develops them. Taking
all into consideration, we could conclude that China has potential in the development
of shipbuilding industry and will challenge Japan in the near future.
102
Chapter 5
China's Competitive Shipbuilding
Strategy
5.1 The Theory of Competitive Strategies
Though one nation can have a myriad of strengths and weaknesses vis-a-vis its com-
petitors in shipbuilding industry, there are two basic types of competitive advantage
a nation can possess: low cost or differentiation. These two basic types lead to three
generic strategies for achieve above-average performance in an industry: cost leader-
ship, differentiation, and focus. The focus strategy has two variants, cost focus and
differentiation focus. The generic strategies are shown in Figure 5-1.
Each of the generic strategies involves a fundamentally different route to competitive
advantage, combining a choice about the type of competitive advantage sought with
the scope of the strategic target in which competitive advantage is to be achieved. The
cost leadership and differentiation strategies seek competitive advantage in a broad
range of industry segments, while focus strategies aim at cost advantage (cost focus)
or differentiation (differentiation focus) in a narrow segment. The specific actions
required to implement each generic strategy vary widely from industry to industry.
While selecting and implementing a generic strategy is far from simple, however, they
are the logical routes to competitive advantage that must be probed in any industry.
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Figure 5-1: Three Generic Strategies[44]
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The notion underlying the concept of generic strategies is that competitive advantage
is at the heart of any strategy, and achieving competitive advantage requires a nation
to make a choice: if a nation is to attain a competitive advantage, it must make
a choice about the type of competitive advantage it seeks to attain and the scope
within which it will attain it. Being "all things to all people" is a recipe for strategic
mediocrity and below-average performance, because it often means that a nation has
no competitive advantage at all in shipbuilding industry.
5.1.1 Cost Leadership
Cost leadership is perhaps the clearest of the three generic strategies. In it, a na-
tion sets out to become the low-cost producer in its industry. The sources of cost
advantage are varied and depend on the structure of the industry. They may include
the pursuit of economics of scale, proprietary technology, preferential access to raw
materials, and other factors. A low-cost producer must find and exploit all sources of
cost advantage. If a nation can achieve and sustain overall cost leadership, then it will
be an above-average performer in its industry provided it can command prices at or
near the industry average. At equivalent or lower prices than its rivals, a cost leader,
however, cannot ignore the bases of differentiation. If its product is not perceived as
comparable or acceptable by buyers, a cost leader will be forced to discount prices
well below competitors, to gain sales. This may nullify the benefits of its favorable
cost position.
A cost leader must achieve parity or proximity in the bases of differentiation rela-
tive to its competitors to be an above-average performer, even though it relies on
cost leadership for its competitive advantage. Parity in the bases of differentiation
allows a cost leader to translate its cost advantage directly into higher profits than
competitors'. Proximity in differentiation means that the price discount necessary to
achieve an acceptable market share does not offset a cost leader's cost advantage and
hence the cost leader earns above-average returns.
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5.1.2 Differentiation
In a differentiation strategy, a nation seeks to be unique in its industry along some
dimensions that are widely valued by buyers. It selects one or more attributes that
many buyers in an industry perceive as important, and uniquely positions itself to
meet those needs. It is rewarded for its uniqueness with a premium price. A nation
that can achieve and sustain differentiation will be an above-average performer in
its industry if its price premium exceeds the extra costs incurred in being unique.
A differentiator, therefore, must always seek ways of differentiating that lead to a
price premium greater than the cost of differentiating. A differentiator cannot ignore
its cost position, because its premium prices will be nullified by a markedly inferior
cost position. A differentiator thus aims at cost parity or proximity relative to its
competitors, by reducing cost in all areas that do not affect differentiation.
5.1.3 Focus: Global Segmentation
This strategy is quite different from the others because it rests on the choice of a
narrow competitive scope within an industry. The focus strategy has two variants.
In cost focus a nation seeks a cost advantage in its target segment, while in differen-
tiation focus a nation seeks differentiation in its target segment. Cost focus exploit
differences in cost behavior in some segments, while differentiation focus exploits the
special needs of buyers in certain segments.
5.1.4 Protected Market
This strategy focuses on a certain countryy. In this strategy, however, a nation's
unique position in the global industry is not based on its economic advantages but
on the willingness of the local government to protect it. Any shipbuilder capable of
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coercing governments to forge an artificial demand for ships through price-support
schemes, credit measures and downright conjuring up of orders on national account
would clearly benefit in the new, competitively charged environment. Soon almost
all main nations were calling for government aids as a matter of course. Whichever
country cancels subsidies will lost this industry in the competitive world. The U.S
shipbuilding is the self-explaining example.
5.2 Global Strategy by Major Shipbuilding Na-
tions
A review of the history that a number of shipbuilding industries took turns as indus-
try leaders(figure 5-2). As we know in chapter 2, British shipbuilding based on the
steel and overall industry became a low-cost leader before 1945. With its technology
went into comparative maturity at that time, English shipbuilders competed with
"global differentiation" strategy. In this period, western countries invested in auto-
matic machines and greatly increased their productivity, so the cost of production
were less than British shipbuilders. The market share lost made British industry rot
away its advantage of differentiation.
The Japanese in the 1950s took the advantage of its low cost labor and its new tech-
nology competed western European countries with low cost strategy. A clear pattern
emerges in terms of changes in national strategies over time. Both western European
countries and Japan show a succession of strategies from low-cost leadership to global
segmentation or global differentiation and then to protected market. This change of
strategies does not necessarily coincide with a shrinkage of market share; it did in
Western Europe, but not in Japan, which held a constant market share of about
45%(table 1.1). The locus of low-cost leadership has moved from the the United
Kingdom, to western Europe, to Japan, and then to Korea. This change suggests
that simple factor-based comparative advantage has been shifting over time and that
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Figure 5-2: Changes in Strategy by Major Shipbuilding Nations[15]
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strategies predicted purely on factor cost advantage are difficult to sustain.
Today, shipbuilders in the major nations are pursuing very different strategies. West-
ern European shipbuilders are pursuing global segmentation strategies(differentiation
focus) and are noted for their superior quality and workmanship on particular vessel
types. The world's most sophisticated ships, such as icebreakers used in the Arctic or
luxurious passenger cruisers, and LNG are invariably built in the shipyards of West
Germany, Finland or other European countries. Successful western European ship-
builders are employing a "global segmentation" strategy in complex vessel categories.
Although Japan builds almost forty percent of the total tonnage in the world, the
order for Crystal Symphony the sistership to the Mitsubishi-built Crystal Harmony,
had gone to Kvaerner Mass-Yards. Clearly price difference was the reason. Japanese
NYK could not ignore a 30% cheaper ship, especially as it would be built by an ac-
knowledged expert yard in cruise ship building. LNG ship orders have also been lost
to Finland[37]. KMY have the contract for the construction of four, 135,000 cube
meter LNG carriers for the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company.
Japanese shipbuilders are competing based on overall differentiation. Japanese ship-
builders can be counted on to keep delivery dates. Their technology allows them to
build even the most sophisticated vessel while their quality standard, especially in
finishing, is high enough to satisfy any ship buyer. Japanese shipbuilders can utilize
a "global differentiation" strategy. Although they do not possess an absolute advan-
tage in any of the criteria considered in ship purchasing, but their combined position
appeals to certain differentiated customer group. In the low-sophisticated vessel cate-
gories, they can focus on quality sensitive customers to edge out Korean shipbuilders
or other NICs. In high-technology categories, they can focus on price-sensitive cus-
tomers to beat the western Europeans. Japanese shipbuilders' critical weakness lies
in labor costs and in their adherence to yen-based contracts. In lots of cases, the
contract would have been signed by Japanese shipyards without yen appreciation.
Korean shipbuilders basing on their low labor cost are competing old shipbuilders in
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Table 5.1: Buyers' Major Buyer Purchaser Criteria by Ship Type[15]
Vessel Category Price Delivery Quality
Oil Tankers 8 2 0
Bulk Carriers 7 3 0
General Cargo Ships 6 3 1
Container ships 4 3 3
LNG Carriers 2 2 6
Passenger Ships 1 2 7
Oil Rigs 1 3 3
oil tankers, bulk carriers, general cargo ships, and even container ships, all of which
are price-sensitive.
5.3 China's Global Strategy for the Shipbuilding
Industry
The review of shipbuilding industry has a number of broad implications for global
competition. First, global competition must be viewed in a dynamic fashion so that
a nation can reshape and refocus its strategy periodically in accordance with the
changes in the economic environment. No one global strategy succeeds for an indefi-
nite time, and a nation must reposition itself to sustain its position as the Japanese
have done. Second, cost leadership is often the preferred entry strategy for new na-
tions, while global differentiation and global segmentation strategies are limited to
existing participants with accumulated capabilities.
Due to huge shipbuilding capacities compared to a depressed demand market,the ship-
building industry belongs to a buyers' market. In this case, satisfying buyer needs is
at the core of success in the shipbuilding industry. Ship buyers consider various fac-
tors when selecting a builder. For any type of ship, the three major considerations are
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price, delivery and quality. The relative weight placed on each factor varies by type
of vessel. As a general rule, price is more important when buying less-sophisticated
vessels, such as oil tankers, bulk carriers, and general cargo ships. Quality is more
important when buying more sophisticated vessels, such as container ships, liquefied
natural gas tankers, and passenger ships. Delivery date is moderately important for
most vessel categories, but very important for those vessels used by merchant ship-
ping companies that want to reduce risks associated with fluctuating freight rates.
Table 5.11 summarizes the opinions of industry experts: one British, two Japanese,
and one Korean[15].
5.3.1 Position
Before we choose a global strategy for the China's shipbuilding industry, it is very im-
portant to have a clear idea where its position is now. According to Table 1.2, China
is in the third place in terms of new building on order which is 6.5% of the total world
order, just following Japan, 38% and South Korea 20%. Most of new buildings on or-
der are bulkers and tankers, less-sophisticated types(Table 5.2). In the past decade,
CSSC has built a total of 7.73 million dwt of vessels, with 40% for shipowners in
countries and regions such as Norway, Sweden, Germany, Italy, Denmark, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, Belgium, the United States, Cuba, Chile, Australia, Japan, Singa-
pore and Hong Kong.
At present, CSSC could build for domestic operation and for export bulk and general
cargo carriers, container and roll-on/roll-off ships, oil rigs and platforms, even small
LPG carriers. A dry 200,000 dwt drydock, the largest in China, will be completed
in 1994 at Dalian. By then, China will be able to build ultra-large vessels of 200,000
to 300,000 dwt tankers. In terms of marine engineering, China is capable of build-
1In each vessel category, the total of 10 points is assigned to the four purchase criteria according
to their relative importance. Vessel sophistication is from Low to high.
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Table 5.2: Newbuilding orders for China's largest shipyards[52]
Yard Shipowner/Flag
Jiangnan Pacific basin/Belgium
Pacific Basin/Belgium
Island Nav/Hong Kong
Island Nav/Hong Kong
Lasco Shipping/US
Lasco Shipping/US
Lasco Shipping/US
COSCO Guanzhou/PRC
COSCO Guanzhou/PRC
COSCO Guanzhou/PRC
COSCO Guanzhou/PRC
COSCO Guanzhou/PRC
Hudong World-wide/Hong Kong
BOMTA/PRC
BOMTA/PRC
BOMTA/PRC
BOMTA/PRC
Oak Steamship/Hong Kong
Oak Steamship/Hong Kong
Far East Ent/Hong Kong
Far East Ent/Hong Kong
COSCO Qingdao/PRC
COSCO Qingdao/PRC
COSCO Qingdao/PRC
COSCO Qingdao/PRC
Dalian BOMTA/PRC
COSCO Dalian/PRC
COSCO Dalian/PRC
BOMTA/PRC
Pertamina/Indonesia
BOMTA/PRC
BOMTA/PRC
Wah Kwong/Hong Kong
Cobelfret/Belgium
Exmar/Belgium
Far East Ent/Hong Kong
BOMTA/PRC
BOMTA/PRC
Type of Vessel
62
62
65
65
70
70
70
70
70
70
70
70
68
68
68
34
34
70
70
70
70
70
70
70
70
60
60
60
60
35
34
34
60
150
150
150
60
60
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
600 dwt
600 dwt
600 dwt
600 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
500 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
000 dwt
tanker
tanker
bulker
bulker
bulker
bulker
bulker
bulker
bulker
bulker
bulker
bulker
tanker
tanker
tanker
tanker
tanker
tanker
tanker
tanker
tanker
tanker
tanker
tanker
tanker
tanker
tanker
tanker
tanker
tanker
tanker
tanker
tanker
bulker
bulker
bulker
tanker
tanker
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Delivery
10.92
1.93
1.93
7.93
10.93
3.94
6.94
10.94
12.94
3.95
6.95
9.95
11.92
7.93
12.93
6.94
11.94
11.93
4.94
5.94
9.94
11.94
3.95
6.95
9.95
6.93
3.94
12.94
7.93
8.93
12.93
5.94
12.94
12.93
6.94
12.94
12.92
3.93
ing heavy-, medium- and light-duty diesels with high-, medium- and low-speed. The
Baoshan Iron & Steel Complex could supply quality steel. Evidence shows that China
is ready to compete with main shipbuilding nations in the building of less sophisti-
cated ships.
It is clear that China will have two main competitors: Japan, and South Korea.
For the time being, western Europeans are not the main competitors because they
mainly build more sophisticated types of vessels. At present, the global environment
favors China's shipbuilding industry. First, Japan is in economic recession, while
the Chinese economy is developing exceptionally fast. From 1980-1990 (Table 4.3) in
China, the average annual GNP growth rate was 8.9. Such fast economic development
in China must result in increased demand for shipping, while economic recession in
Japan causes the reverse. The demand for shipping decides how big the fleet should
be. In fact, domestic demand for shipbuilding plays an important role in main ship-
building nations. Moreover, the average age of the Japanese fleet is 9.7 years, while
that of the Chinese fleet is 17.9 (Table 4.7). Especially, the age difference in general
cargo ships is the biggest, 19.6 for China and 9.2 for Japan. It is obvious that the
Chinese fleet needs new ships more urgently than the Japanese fleet. Coincidentally,
general cargo ships are China's target segment in which Chinese shipyards already en-
joy comparative advantage. It is clear that the new ship order from domestic demand
favors Chinese shipyards. Another disadvantageous factor for Japanese shipyards is
that the appreciation of yen has made it difficult for Japanese shipyards to compete
in terms of price-sensitive types of ships which are China's target segments. Further-
more, the world economic recession has brought about a depressed shipping market
which has resulted in buyers' focusing attention more on price rather than on ship
quality and prestigious yards. It is difficult for Japanese yards to get premium prices
by global differentiation strategy to make up for its high cost of labor. In the mean-
time, the Chinese government has been supporting shipbuilding industry with heavy
investments while other nations have cut back. The rebounding world economy will
come soon because the recession has already lasted a long time. Once the better time
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comes China will have the capacity in place like South Korea in 1975.
Second,China's another main competitor, South Korea has depended on low labor
cost, low machinery and low steel costs and the relatively low value of the Korean
won against the world's major currencies. These advantages are changing. South Ko-
rea is no longer a low-wage country. Wages have doubled in the past three years[4].
This will result in increases both in labor and material. In fact, the wages are rising
faster in South Korea than productivity. New building prices quoted today are at the
same level as those in Japan. In 1970s, China's shipbuilding industry had lost the
chances of competing with other countries because of its closed door policy. Another
chance for China seems to be opening.
5.3.2 The Proper Strategy for China
Today, Japanese shipbuilders are pursuing differentiation, South Korean shipbuilders
are competing based on cost leadership and segmentation, while western European
shipbuilders are adopting differentiation focus strategy. Technology allows the Japanese
to build even the most sophisticated vessels. In the meantime, shipbuilding capacity
makes it possible for Japan to pursue a differentiation strategy. The wide scope in
South Korea's shipbuilding industry and comparative low labor cost allows them to
compete based on cost leadership. The prestigious reputation and sophisticated tech-
nology of western European shipbuilders allows them to compete based on segmenta-
tion. As a new shipbuilding nation, China has none of Japan's advanced technology,
none of South Korea's large scale, let alone western Europe's reputation. Differentia-
tion is obviously unsuitable for China's shipbuilding industry at the present time. So
is the differentiation focus strategy. That China can not choose cost leadership at the
present time is not as obvious as the two strategies mentioned above. Cost leadership
requires a very wide scope in the industry. Until now, China has no capability for
building very sophisticated ships. For example, China still has to order big box ships
from foreign shipyards, for example, COSCO ordered 3800 teu capacity box ships
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from Japan and Germany[35]. Cost leadership demands large volume to amortize the
cost over a great sales volume. South Korea can build the largest container ships and
sophisticated LNG, while China can not.
In its present stage, China should choose the cost focus strategy emphasizing less-
sophisticated types of ships. From the comparison in Chapter 4, we know that pro-
ductivity in China's HSY is much lower than in Japan's KHI. As can be seen in
Chapter 4, Chinese HSY needed 3.27 times more man-hours in building PD124 than
Japanese KHI even though KHI was 6 years ahead of HSY. During these six years,
KHI would increase productivity greatly, which means that 3.27 really underestimates
the Japanese productivity compared with that of the Chinese shipyards. But Chinese
labor is almost as low as one-twentieth of Japanese labor. Even if the difference of
productivity were as much as ten times, Chinese shipyards still would have the com-
petitive advantage in cost-sensitive types of ships.
However, shipyard should not just depend on low labor cost to neglect investment
in automatic machines to increase productivity. Competitive advantage on low labor
cost is unsophisticated and often fleeting. Sometimes this advantage will result in
disadvantage because shipyards do not employ labor efficiently. Shipbuilding illus-
trates that simple factor advantages such as labor costs are rarely sufficient to gain
or sustain a strong international position. Brazil, Spain, and Poland did not succeed
despite it. Although the labor cost in China is as one-twentieth as much in Japan
now or even the relative difference will last a long time because of special endless
source of inexpensive labor in China, the gap will be getting smaller and smaller. In
fact, Chinese workers' wages will increase more sharply than Japanese ones, because
wage in Japan has been saturated. If China does not invest in automation machines
to increase the productivity based on the contemporary cheap labor, China will lose
the comparative advantage in labor cost because of the big productivity difference.
In the other direction, the labor cost of other poor countries is much lower than in
China. In terms of the cost of labor, Japan's today will be China's tomorrow. Only
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productivity is the true source of comparative advantage in shipbuilding industry. As
we knew, the simple labor cost advantage can not sustain a long time.
In export market, China as a new shipbuilding nation should place their empha-
sis on the price-sensitive and labor-sensitive types of ships which possess over 70% in
terms of deadweight ton(table 3.1) in the world shipbuilding output. As we can see in
the table 5.1, oil tankers, bulker carriers and general cargo ships are price-sensitive.
They are less-sophisticated, so Chinese shipyards are capable of building. Further-
more, buyers like to order from low-price shipyards, because of the poor shipping
market.
In the low-sophisticated vessel categories, China could compete Japan depending
on the low cost labor, in the meantime, it could compete South Korea based on its
increasing quality and productivity. Cost focus strategy will lead China to special-
ization in shipbuilding. Specialization may be conducive to comparative advantage
whereby the shipyards either gains a reputation for excellence in those types of ships
or commands attention by virtue of the competitive prices it can charge for those
ships. As we knew in the case of PD214, Chinese HSY spent only 82 percent total
man-hours(table 4.10) of the first ship on the fifth ship. It is obvious that productiv-
ity could also result from the learning curve which could help sustain the advantage
of Chinese low labor cost. For example, a lot of owners are interested in a new type
of panamax vessel China shipyards. The main reason for burgeoning interest from
abroad is an increase in productivity which results in the $30m competitive price.
In the meantime, the concentration should be put on ship quality and make good
reputation. Because sometimes the shipowners would rather pay premium for the
shipyards with good reputation than take risks saving some money. If the ship is not
acceptable by buyers because of the low quality problem, a cost focuser is forced to
discount prices well below competitors' to gain sales. This may nullify the benefits
of its favorable cost position in the target segments. Improvement in the ship quality
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could be achieved through such measures as using joint ventures to bring in improved
manufacturing techniques, licensing agreements to bring in proven, well engineered
designs to improve the quality of the shipyards. In fact, licensing agreements from
Japan are more difficult than from Europe. Because Japanese yards have more new
shipbuilding orders than European counterparts so that they are unwilling to transfer
new technologies to their competitors compared with European ones. Japan has a
clear idea how their shipbuilding industry prospected depending on technology trans-
fer from Europe and U.S.A. To make the matter worse, that Japan will tend to invent
more technologies than Europe will result in a little bit more difficulties in technology
transfer in shipbuilding industry than before. In that case, China should spend more
money on R&D to short the technological gap with Japan.
During the cost focus strategy phase, China should develop its overall capability of
building various kinds of ships through technology transfer and joint ventures. Joint
ventures provided China with an operational capability that may not have existed.
Joint ventures also provided a quick, inexpensive way to close the gap between China
and the established market, both in terms of technology and structure. In a joint
venture the operation took the name of the established firm, and since that firm both
set-up and managed operations, China will realize an increase in credibility in an
area where it may have been previously deficient. With the help of the joint ventures,
China could squeeze into more sophisticated types like liquefied gas tankers in a short
time. For example, a Sino-Germany joint venture has been set up in Shanghai, which
will concentrate on liquefied gas and chemical product ships. Two 15,000 cube meter
liquefied gas ships are planned to build, which will be exported[36]. One advantage
with license agreements is that it helps China establish a credibility that did not
previously exist. These two methods are helping significantly improve China's repu-
tation in the production area.
In the domestic market, Chinese shipbuilders should target all segments of ships.
In fact, the large domestic market, which any shipbuilding nation would envy espe-
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cially during the trough of a sever worldwide shipbuilding down-cycle, allows Chinese
shipbuilders to achieve cost efficiency through efficient production and learning and
accumulate some level of technology before going to the export market. The experi-
ence acquired in the domestic market will benefit Chinese shipbuilders. In fact, China
has completed the research of developing 2800-3500 etu container ship, which will set
up the foundation of designing and building this ship by themselves. Reefer has been
regarded as one important type of ships by CSSC and lots of researchers have begun
to develop during the Eighth Five-Year Plan. With the efforts of government and
CSSC, China will have been capable of building various types of vessels by the end
of this century.
In less sophisticated vessels, China has gradually been regarded as a nation with
good quality. Sir Yue-Kong Pao, ex-chairman of World-Wide shipping Group, one of
the world's largest shipping operators, whose companies have bought Chinese-built
ships, commended, "Chinese shipyards are capable of building top-class vessels which
can be compared favorably with those produced by yards anywhere in the world in
design, workmanship and performance". However, China still needs a certain time to
establish the reputation which is very important to bid in sophisticated ships because
of the requirement of high quality. After more ships are exported, the reputation
will be set up. By then, China's shipbuilding will have gone into maturity because
of both the easy technology transfer in shipbuilding and their own efforts. At that
time China will compete other nations with cost leadership strategy because of the
capability of building various types of ships and good reputation. With the rapid
economic development, China needs not only various types of ships but also large
demands because of her would-be superpower in the world. China will be the leader
in shipbuilding, the only question is the time.
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